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Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of 
Guidance Documents 
Mark Seidenfeld* 
This Article proposes that courts substitute immediate substantive review 
for procedural review of agency guidance documents.  The Article begins by 
reviewing the extensive literature about how courts should treat nonlegislative 
rules.  Because such rules play an important role in assuring coherence and 
accountability of agency policies and interpretations and in communicating the 
views of agencies about such matters, the Article agrees with those who 
advocate ex post monitoring of agency use of rules issued without notice-and-
comment procedures.  Recognizing that ex post monitoring leaves much leeway 
for agencies to abuse guidance documents by depriving stakeholders of 
opportunities to participate in their development and of obtaining substantive 
judicial review of them, the Article advocates that nonlegislative rules generally 
should be subject to arbitrary and capricious review when issued.  The Article 
proceeds to explain why other proposals to rein in agency discretion to use 
guidance documents—in particular, making the agency explain its decision to 
proceed by this mode and forcing the agency to consider timely petitions for 
reconsideration of such documents—are likely to have less effect with greater 
cost than its proposal for direct review of guidance documents. 
In advocating for such review, however, the Article contends that courts 
will need to massage doctrines governing availability of review, such as those 
governing finality and ripeness of guidance documents.  Even more significantly, 
the Article argues that review for reasoned decisionmaking will have to be 
modified to avoid seriously compromising the speed and procedural flexibility 
that make guidance documents an attractive means for agencies to communicate 
their views of policy and interpretation.  It therefore develops a variant on 
arbitrary and capricious review that would require agencies to explain issuance 
of guidance in terms of factors that are relevant and alternatives that are 
plausible given the state of knowledge available to the agency when it acted.  
The Article concludes that such a doctrine can encourage agencies to solicit 
input even from stakeholders outside the issue networks affected by the guidance 
document, while preserving sufficient flexibility for the agency to issue the 
document quickly and without undue procedural burden. 
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Introduction 
Much ink has been spilled over the past three decades about the way 
federal agencies issue interpretive rules and statements of policy—which 
together are known as guidance documents or nonlegislative rules—and the 
way courts react to such documents.1  Scholarship on guidance documents 
has developed into a debate between those who bemoan judicial doctrines 
that enable agencies to issue them too easily and those who complain that 
courts have imposed arbitrary barriers to their use,2 with at least one recent 
participant intimating, in the vein of Goldilocks,3 that courts have gotten it 
just right.4  For the most part, scholarship has focused on procedural impedi-
ments to issuing guidance documents, with much of the debate addressing 
how courts should determine whether a rule is “legislative” rather than mere 
guidance.5  This Article reviews this debate, explaining why those who favor 
giving agencies more leeway to use guidance documents have the better 
argument.  More importantly, however, it illustrates that even this more 
defensible position is incomplete because it allows an agency to avoid 
stakeholder participation and judicial oversight and, thereby, to abuse 
issuance of guidance documents. 
Some scholars have attempted to transcend this debate, suggesting 
solutions to the problems of agency abuse that do not depend on courts 
finding agency procedures defective.  For example, one scholar has advo-
cated that courts demand explanations from agencies about the choice of 
procedural mode by which they make policy—the choice to proceed by in-
terpretative rule or policy statement rather than adjudication or legislative 
 
1. There has also been recent attention given to guidance documents in state administrative law.  
See, e.g., REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 311 & cmt. (2010) (setting out model 
guidelines for the issuance and binding effect of guidance documents).  Although many of the 
arguments I make have merit for state administrative law, this Article directly addresses only 
federal administrative law. 
2. Compare Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, 
and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1372 
(1992) (concluding that numerous policy documents bind the public and therefore should have been 
issued as legislative rules), with Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: 
Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 807 (2001) (criticizing 
the D.C. Circuit for unduly restricting agency use of guidance documents). 
3. See generally JAMES MARSHALL, GOLDILOCKS AND THE THREE BEARS (1988). 
4. See David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short 
Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 324–25 (2010) (contending that current doctrine is better than competing 
approaches for determining whether rules are legislative).  To be fair to Franklin, he does not argue 
that current doctrine is problem free.  See id. at 324 (acknowledging all of the current doctrine’s 
“smog and muddle”). 
5. See, e.g., id. at 324–25 (concluding that current doctrine is better than competing approaches 
in determining whether a rule is legislative rather than mere guidance); William Funk, When Is a 
“Rule” a Regulation? Marking a Clear Line Between Nonlegislative Rules and Legislative Rules, 
54 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 671 (2002) (arguing that a “simple, notice-and-comment test works for 
determining whether a rule is a legislative” or not); Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1705, 1719 (2007) (arguing that if notice-and-comment procedures were used, “the 
rule should be deemed legislative and binding . . . .  If they were not, the rule is nonlegislative.”). 
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rulemaking.6  Another has focused on the hardships that use of guidance 
documents can cause to regulatory beneficiaries and has suggested allowing 
stakeholders to petition for amendment or repeal of a guidance document.7  
This Article evaluates these two proposals and demonstrates that they are 
unlikely to achieve their objectives because they fail to recognize that current 
doctrines of review must be modified to make them sufficiently rigorous to 
prevent agency abuse of guidance documents without so burdening their use 
as to forfeit the efficiencies that make them valuable regulatory tools. 
Finally, and most significantly, this Article proposes to shift the debate 
from one of procedural requirements to one of substantive review of guid-
ance documents.  It advocates that courts modify their application of 
justiciability doctrines to allow stakeholders to obtain immediate review 
of nonlegislative rules under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 
including, most significantly, arbitrary and capricious review.8  It also sug-
gests how courts can tailor reasoned-decisionmaking review to discourage 
agencies from abusing guidance documents9 and to encourage them to take 
more care and include more stakeholders in the development of such 
documents,10 without unduly bogging down the issuance of these documents. 
I. Modes of Policy Making and Interpretation 
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) defines a rule as “the whole 
or a part of an agency statement of . . . future effect designed to implement, 
 
6. See Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1385 
(2004) (contending that courts do not permit agencies to select their preferred policy-making form 
without explanation—courts establish the standard of review under which the action will be 
assessed, determine who can bring a suit and when it can be brought, and “shape the procedures that 
an agency must follow when it relies on a policymaking tool”). 
7. Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 397, 434 (2007). 
8. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).  Bill Funk made similar suggestions in a proposed bill he 
presented to the Administrative Law Forum.  William Funk, Legislating for Nonlegislative Rules, 
56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1023, 1024–26 (2004).  The form of Funk’s essay, however, precluded a 
comprehensive analysis of his proposal and the need to modify doctrine to allay concerns about 
immediate reviewability.  See id. at 1024 (explaining that due to spatial constraints the author was 
unable to treat all of the issues in a holistic fashion).  Furthermore, my proposal would obviate the 
need for Congress to amend the APA, a prospect that is unlikely. 
9. The Supreme Court adopted the reasoned-decisionmaking approach to arbitrary and 
capricious review in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).  See also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: 
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 476–77 (2003) 
(noting that the Supreme Court adopted a version of the D.C. Circuit’s “hard-look” standard, 
“ensuring that agencies respond to criticisms and explain their rejection of alternative solutions”). 
10. In one of his many articles on guidance documents, Professor Robert Anthony advocated 
that policy statements be substantively reviewed with less deference than that usually accorded 
under the hard-look test.  Robert A. Anthony & David A. Codevilla, Pro-Ossification: A Harder 
Look at Agency Policy Statements, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 667, 680 (1996).  Anthony, however, 
does not address when such review should occur. 
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interpret, or prescribe law or policy . . . .”11  It further provides that an agency 
must provide notice of a proposed rule and an opportunity for comment 
before the agency can promulgate a rule.12  The APA, however, includes an 
exception from notice and comment for “interpretative [sic] rules,” and 
“general statements of [agency] policy,”13 that is, guidance documents.14  
These two classes of rules have been the subject of numerous judicial 
opinions that are confusing, inconsistent, and the subject of much scholarship 
that, while attempting to clear up the judicial mess, has itself spawned lively 
debate. 
To those unversed in the peculiarities of administrative law, a rule is a 
mandate by the government with which entities subject to the rule are 
commanded to comply, often upon threat of sanction.15  Such rules are 
known in administrative law as “legislative rules.”16  Guidance documents, 
however, differ from legislative rules because they do not command anyone 
to do anything.17  That is, in a sense on which I will elaborate later, they do 
not have independent binding legal force.18  They merely indicate how the 
agency intends, at the time the document is issued, to exercise discretion it 
may enjoy when the agency does take action with direct legal 
consequences.19  Courts have reasoned that lack of legal force is what 
justifies the exemption from notice-and-comment rulemaking.20  
 
11. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). 
12. Id. § 553(b)–(c). 
13. Id. 
14. Originally, guidance documents referred to informal statements such as press releases, 
which seemed not to be included in the class of interpretive rules and policy statements.  Peter L. 
Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1468 (1992).  Given that even press 
releases and instructions to staff generally inform regulated entities of an agency’s current view of a 
policy or interpretation and come within the APA’s definition of a rule, current parlance treats these 
documents as interpretive rules or policy statements.  See Michael Asimow, Guidance Documents 
in the States: Toward a Safe Harbor, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 631, 632 (2002) (calling interpretive rules 
and policy statements “guidance documents”); Mendelson, supra note 7, at 398–99 (explaining that 
she refers to interpretive rules and policy statements excepted from the APA notice-and-comment 
procedures as “guidance documents” and listing examples). 
15. See Funk, supra note 5, at 659 (asserting that legislative rules have the force of law). 
16. See Gersen, supra note 5, at 1709 (describing some confusion of terminology, but stating 
that usually “a rule is termed legislative if it is legally binding”). 
17. See Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, “Legislative” Rules and “Spurious” Rules: 
Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 14 (1994) [hereinafter Anthony, Lifting the Smog] (“[An 
agency] cannot lawfully attempt to compel compliance through a mere bulletin or guidance or other 
nonlegislative document.”). 
18. See infra text accompanying notes 84–85. 
19. See TOM C. CLARK, ATT’Y GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL 
ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (1947) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
MANUAL] (defining interpretive rules as those “issued by an agency to advise the public of the 
agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it administers,” and general statements of 
policy as those “issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the 
agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power”). 
20. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 569 F.3d 416, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing 
Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d 798, 807 (D.C. Cir. 2006)) 
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Unfortunately, beyond consensus that nonlegislative rules cannot be enforced 
in their own right, the precise notion of what force should distinguish legis-
lative rules from guidance documents has confused the courts.21 
To understand what is at issue in the debate about how to distinguish 
legislative from nonlegislative rules, it is helpful to summarize the various 
modes by which an agency can issue an interpretation or set policy.  Agency 
actions that represent exercises of an agency’s uniquely sovereign role in-
clude issuing legislative rules, issuing orders or permits in accordance with 
adjudication of particular cases, and prosecuting alleged unlawful conduct.  
Some agencies are statutorily authorized to take only one of these kinds of 
actions;22 others are authorized to take two or even all three.23 
A. Legislative Rulemaking 
The canonical mode by which agencies define the meaning of statutes 
and regulations or establish policy is legislative rulemaking.24  Under current 
 
(stating that in distinguishing a statement of policy from a legislative rule, “the court looks to the 
effects of the agency’s action, asking whether the agency has imposed any rights and obligations or 
has left itself free to exercise discretion”); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1024 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating that whether a rule is interpretive depends on “whether the interpretation 
itself carries the force and effect of law” (quoting Paralyzed Veterans v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 
579, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1997))); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974) (distinguishing a substantive rule from a statement of policy on the grounds that the latter 
“does not establish a ‘binding norm’” (quoting Reginald Parker, The Administrative Procedure Act: 
A Study in Overestimation, 60 YALE L.J. 581, 598 (1951))). 
21. See, e.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety, 452 F.3d at 807 (comparing cases and concluding that the 
case law demonstrates that “it is not always easy to distinguish between those ‘general statements of 
policy’ that are unreviewable and agency ‘rules’ that establish binding norms or agency actions that 
occasion legal consequences that are subject to review”). 
22. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136w (2006) (granting the Administrator of the EPA authority to issue 
rules to carry out provisions in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act); 29 U.S.C. 
§ 211 (2006) (granting the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division prosecutorial power to 
bring all actions for injunctions to restrain violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act); id. § 659 
(granting OSHRC authority to resolve contests of the Secretary of Labor’s citations of violation 
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006) (granting the 
EEOC prosecutorial power to prevent violations of Title VII). 
23. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 371–372 (2006) (granting the FDA regulatory, adjudicatory, and 
prosecutorial power under the Federal Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act); 29 U.S.C. §§ 156–161 
(granting the NLRB regulatory, prosecutorial, and adjudicatory power under the National Labor 
Relations Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7601(a), 7605, 7607 (granting the EPA regulatory, prosecutorial, and 
adjudicatory power under the Clean Air Act); 47 U.S.C. § 154(i)–(j) (2006) (granting the FCC 
regulatory, prosecutorial, and adjudicatory power to regulate wire and radio communications under 
the Communications Act of 1954). 
24. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (“The function of filling 
in the interstices of the Act should be performed, as much as possible, through this quasi-legislative 
promulgation of rules to be applied in the future.”); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 6.15, at 283 (Supp. 1970) (“The procedure of administrative rule making is one of the 
greatest inventions of modern government.”); Glen O. Robinson, The Making of Administrative 
Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 
U. PA. L. REV. 485, 505–06 (1970) (stating that “[t]here are . . . advantages in promulgating general 
regulatory policies in rulemaking proceedings,” but then proceeding to show that in particular 
situations, there are reasons to allow agencies to use adjudication to announce policy). 
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standards of reasoned decisionmaking, an agency that adopts an interpreta-
tion or policy within a legislative rule has to explain why it did so given the 
record before it when it acted.25  As already intimated, such rules carry 
independent force of law in the sense that, if valid, an entity can be punished 
for violating them without proof that it violated the letter or spirit of the 
statute pursuant to which the rule was issued.26  Legislative rules also bind 
the agency, which must comply with its own rules.27  If the agency wants to 
act in a manner inconsistent with a legislative rule, it first has to change the 
rule. 
The advantages of legislative rulemaking for announcing interpretations 
or policy are several.  First, because legislative rulemaking requires notice 
and comment,28 entities affected by the rule have an opportunity to provide 
input, and the agency gets the benefit of the information they supply.29  
Although some argue that most meaningful participation occurs before a 
legislative rule is formulated,30 agency consideration of such a rule generally 
 
25. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) 
(clarifying that even when an agency removes or changes a regulation, it must still supply a 
reasoned analysis for its decision); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 
420 (1971) (mandating that courts review agency decisions based on the record before the agency 
when it acted). 
26. See Strauss, supra note 14, at 1466–67 (noting that violation of a legislative rule “may form 
the basis for penal consequences”). 
27. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265–67 (1954); see also 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Accardi Principle, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 569, 596 (2006) (arguing that 
this principle has significance for how agencies and courts treat guidance documents). 
28. Technically, an agency may adopt a legislative rule without using notice-and-comment 
procedures if it can show good cause for why it opted to skip this process.  5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) 
(2006) (stating that notice-and-comment rulemaking does not apply “when the agency for good 
cause finds . . . notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to 
the public interest”).  Successful invocation of this exception, however, requires some situation-
specific explanation by the agency of why notice and comment is “impracticable, unnecessary, or 
contrary to the public interest.”  See Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining 
Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1780–81 & n.244, 1783 (2007) (“Courts are often skeptical of generic 
assertions of the need for immediate guidance . . . .”). 
29. Richard K. Berg, Re-examining Policy Procedures: The Choice Between Rulemaking and 
Adjudication, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 149, 163–64 (1986) (“Rulemaking [provides regulated entities] 
wider notice and broader opportunities for participation . . . .  Such broader participation also makes 
rulemaking more efficient as an information-gathering technique for the agency.”); see also 
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 414 & n.6 
(2005) (“Agencies react to the notice-and-comment process by making changes in their proposed 
rules.”); Susan Webb Yackee, Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest Group 
Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 103, 103 (2005) 
(finding that agencies are responsive to consensus in public comments and make changes in final 
rules in response to comments). 
30. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. 
REV. 201, 231–32 (stating that pressure on agencies to provide responses to comments has caused 
them “to complete the bulk of their work prior to the onset of the rulemaking process”); Cary 
Coglianese et al., Transparency and Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process: 
Recommendations for the New Administration, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 931–32 (2009) (“Many 
internal deliberations and policy discussions occur before an agency issues its NPRM, during a part 
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is known well before the agency publishes a notice of proposed rulemaking.31  
Therefore, such rules attract more attention, and agencies provide more 
opportunity for interest-group involvement in their formulation than agencies 
do for other means of developing policy or interpretations.  Second, 
legislative rulemaking provides significant advance notice of the potential 
interpretation or policy that the agency may adopt.  Notice of a proposed 
legislative rule must be meaningful in the sense of at least informing the 
public about what the final rule might entail.32  Because a controversial 
legislative rulemaking usually takes years,33 the announcement of a rule in 
the agency’s regulatory agenda and the notice of proposed rulemaking 
essentially give entities several years to plan for compliance with the final 
rule that may result.  In this sense, legislative rulemaking provides strong 
protection of reliance interests on current interpretations and policies. 
The costs and long lead times for legislative rulemaking, however, have 
downsides as well.  An agency may discover a loophole in its regulatory 
scheme or some dire scenario that was not envisioned when it adopted rele-
vant legislative rules.34  New information or changed circumstances may 
warrant a change in existing policy.  A change in administration may also 
prompt a change in the significance placed on costs of compliance or the 
benefits of a regulatory scheme, encouraging a current agency to desire a 
change in policy or interpretation.35  The delay inherent in legislative 
 
of the process that is least open and transparent.”); Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory 
Maintenance and Administrative Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 600 (2002) (discussing 
empirical evidence that agencies “lock in” to a rule once it is proposed). 
31. See Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, 
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1956–57 (2008) 
(arguing that repeat players can provide input well before the agency issues a notice of proposed 
rulemaking (NOPR)).  Agencies today frequently publish an advanced NOPR, which is intended to 
get public comment before the agency has committed to a particular proposed course of action.  
Barbara H. Brandon & Robert D. Carlitz, Online Rulemaking and Other Tools for Strengthening 
Our Civil Infrastructure, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1421, 1465–66 (2002). 
32. See NRDC v. EPA, 279 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that a final rule may 
deviate from a proposed rule only when “‘interested parties reasonably could have anticipated the 
final rulemaking from the [proposed rule]’” (quoting NRDC v. EPA, 863 F.2d 1420, 1429 (9th Cir. 
1988))). 
33. See Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Time and Rulemaking: An Empirical Test of 
Theory, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 113, 124, 134–37 (1992) (reviewing data showing that 
major EPA rules took, on average, three years from the time the rule entered the agency’s 
regulatory-development management system and the date the final rule was issued). 
34. See Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947) (allowing the SEC to adopt a policy by 
adjudication, in part because “problems may arise in a case which the administrative agency could 
not reasonably foresee”); cf. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Rulemaking Versus Adjudication: A 
Psychological Perspective, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 529, 551 (2005) (positing that the dynamic, 
adversarial nature of management–labor relations makes it “difficult for an agency to foresee the 
consequences of any rule it might adopt”). 
35. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the 
Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 953–54 (2008) (noting that, compared to 
independent agencies, executive agencies engage in much more regulatory activity in the last 
quarter of a president’s term). 
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rulemaking imposes the foregone benefit of a better or more accountable 
policy or interpretation while the rule is being changed.  In some instances, 
need for change in the policy or interpretation does not warrant agency 
investment of resources in a full-blown legislative rulemaking.36  In such 
situations, notice and comment becomes an expensive proposition with fewer 
concomitant benefits. 
B. Adjudication 
For these reasons, shortly after the APA was adopted, the Supreme 
Court held that an agency may create new policy or issue a new 
interpretation as part of an adjudicatory proceeding.37  The outcome of such a 
proceeding is an order that has binding force on parties named in it.38  In that 
sense, orders, like rules, have independent legal significance.  An entity that 
violates an agency order is subject to sanction as specified in the statute 
authorizing the agency to issue such orders.39 
Some statutes require agencies to use formal trial-type procedures in 
adjudications.40  Such procedures allow the entities facing the potential order 
to participate in the proceeding and to submit evidence and their views 
on relevant agency policies and interpretations.41  In addition, liberal 
understandings of intervention and other participation rights in agency 
proceedings allow other interested entities avenues for participation and input 
into agency policies and interpretations at issue in a formal adjudication.42  
Agency adjudication, however, also includes the bulk of day-to-day decisions 
 
36. See E. Donald Elliott, Re-inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992) (asserting 
that the wisdom of adopting policy by legislative rulemaking depends on, among other things, “how 
frequently the agency anticipates the question will come up”). 
37. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 203. 
38. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 418 (1942). 
39. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2006) (specifying penalties for violations of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934); 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006) (specifying penalties for violations of the Clean 
Water Act); 47 U.S.C. §§ 501–502 (2006) (specifying penalties for violations of the 
Communications Act of 1934); 49 U.S.C. §§ 46301–46304 (2006) (specifying penalties for 
violations of airline safety regulations). 
40. If a statute requires an agency to issue an order based on the record after opportunity for a 
hearing, the APA requires the agency to use trial-type formal procedures.  5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556–
557 (2006). 
41. Id. § 556(d). 
42. See Office of Commc’n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000–06 
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (holding that a group whose members listen to a radio station have the right to 
participate in a hearing on whether to relicense the station); see also 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (“So far as 
the orderly conduct of public business permits, an interested person may appear before an agency 
. . . for the presentation, adjustment, or determination of an issue, request, or controversy in a 
proceeding . . . .”).  However, particular provisions of the statute authorizing the adjudication may 
restrict who may participate.  See, e.g., Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 
194 F.3d 72, 75, 77–78 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that even though a statute required an agency to 
grant intervenor status to “any person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding,” the 
agency could deny such status to an already-licensed competitor of the entity seeking a license 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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that result in orders, and for most of these, the APA and most statutes do 
not require that the agency use any procedure.43  For such “informal 
adjudication,” the interested entities’ ability to provide input into the agency 
decision is reduced because many informal adjudications fly below the radar 
screen of interest groups that might want to participate in the formulation of 
relevant interpretations or policy.  In addition, an agency may apply a new 
policy or interpretation in an adjudication without any prior notice of its 
intent to do so.44  Such leeway is necessary to allow an agency to close 
loopholes in regulations.  Moreover, an agency may need to develop a policy 
in reaction to various factual scenarios that it faces and may find a case-by-
case approach more effective than attempting to foresee and address all 
factual variants in a synoptic rulemaking proceeding.45  Hence, if the result of 
the new policy or interpretation would undermine legitimate reliance 
interests, an agency may have to choose between upsetting such interests and 
not adopting the policy or interpretation that it believes is best. 
Out of concern for reliance interests, the courts have limited agency 
ability to change policy or interpretations in adjudicatory proceedings.  In 
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,46 the Supreme Court held that the NLRB could 
change a long-standing interpretation of whether all buyers are “managerial” 
employees under the National Labor Relations Act.47  The Court explained 
that rulemaking is the preferable route for changing long-standing interpreta-
tions of law and that agency decisions to use adjudication to change an 
interpretation are subject to review for abuse of discretion.48  But Bell was 
very tolerant of the NLRB’s use of adjudication, holding that the agency was 
not precluded from making such a change when the resulting order did not 
impose any substantial penalty.49 
 
43. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 653–56 (1990) (holding that 
the only requirements the APA imposes on informal adjudications are contained in § 555, which 
sets out “minimal requirements”).  If the agency order denies liberty or property, then the Due 
Process Clause will mandate the minimum procedure that agency must use in the adjudication.  
E.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–33 (1976). 
44. 5 U.S.C. § 535(b)(A) (stating that notice is not required prior to the issuance of 
“interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or 
practice”). 
45. See Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 
431–34 (1981) (analyzing when synoptic versus incremental approaches to regulation are 
appropriate). 
46. 416 U.S. 267 (1974). 
47. Id. at 294–95. 
48. Id. 
49. Essentially, Bell balanced the agency interest in proceeding by adjudication against the 
adverse consequences to reliance interests.  The Court deferred to the implicit determination by the 
agency that retroactive application was sufficiently important and downplayed reliance interests 
because there was no showing “that the adverse consequences ensuing from such reliance are so 
substantial that the Board should be precluded from reconsidering the issue in an adjudicative 
proceeding.”  Id. 
340 Texas Law Review [Vol. 90:331 
 
Over the years, the D.C. Circuit has tried to develop more meaningful 
standards governing when an agency may change long-standing interpreta-
tions by adjudication.  Traditionally, that court has permitted retroactive 
changes to interpretations when the need for the retroactivity is clear, 
important, and not outweighed by legitimate reliance interests in the old 
interpretation.50  Recent case law, however, has drifted to focus solely on 
whether an interpretation changed the law rather than interpreted existing 
law.  Focus on “change in law” implicitly considers only the legitimacy of 
the regulated entity’s reliance interests—in essence, the fairness to those 
regulated—rather than balancing those interests against the agency’s interest 
in retroactive application.51 
C. Guidance Documents 
Announcing a new policy or interpretation in a guidance document 
promises significant social benefits when there is good reason not to make 
the announcement by legislative rulemaking.  Notice-and-comment proce-
dures are time-consuming and demanding of agency resources, which may 
make them an inefficient means of tweaking policy or interpretations already 
adopted by legislative rule.52  In contrast, the APA requires only that an 
agency publish interpretive rules or statements of policy in the Federal 
Register,53 and if a person against whom the agency seeks to use the 
document has actual notice of it, the agency pays no penalty even if it 
neglects to do that.54  Hence, the process of issuing a guidance document can 
 
50. See, e.g., Kieran Ringgenberg, United States v. Chrysler: The Conflict Between Fair 
Warning and Adjudicative Retroactivity in D.C. Circuit Administrative Law, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
914, 923 & nn.60–64 (1999) (summarizing cases in which the D.C. Circuit evaluated the retroactive 
application of changed agency interpretations). 
51. See, e.g., Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(stating that retroactive application of interpretations are limited to “new applications of [existing] 
law, clarifications, and additions” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)); Verizon Tel. Cos. v. 
FCC, 269 F.3d 1098, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“In the ensuing years, in considering whether to give 
retroactive application to a new rule, the courts have held that the governing principle is that when 
there is a substitution of new law for old law that was reasonably clear, the new rule may 
justifiably” [not be given retroactive effect, but] [b]y contrast, retroactive effect is appropriate for 
new applications of [existing] law, clarifications, and additions.” (third alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Williams Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 3 F.3d 1544, 1554 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993) (holding that when an agency substitutes new law for old, “it may be necessary to deny 
retroactive effect to a rule announced in an agency adjudication in order to protect the settled 
expectations of those who had relied on the preexisting rule”). 
52. See Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy 
Statements, 75 MICH. L. REV. 520, 529–30 (1977) (noting that agency staff members universally 
oppose a statutory notice-and-comment requirement for guidance documents because they fear it 
would add to delay and agency costs, often with no concomitant benefit). 
53. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (2006). 
54. The APA provides that “[e]xcept to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of 
the terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be . . . adversely affected by[] a matter required 
to be published in the Federal Register and not so published.”  Id. § 552(a)(1).  Additionally, a 
statement of policy or interpretation may be “used, or cited as precedent by an agency against a 
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be quicker and more flexible than adopting a legislative rule.  Given the 
incentives facing agencies, the alternative to use of guidance documents 
often would be simply to announce policies and interpretations as part of 
adjudications.55  In most cases, this would be unfortunate.  Guidance 
documents apply prospectively; hence, using them protects reliance interests 
better than proceeding by adjudication.56  In essence, regulated entities gain 
information about what the agency is considering from guidance documents.  
Compared to having to guess about how the agency might react to their 
conduct, regulated entities are in a much better position if they know the 
likely reaction.57 
Guidance documents can also increase the consistency and 
accountability of agency action.  Consider an agency that is responsible for 
prosecuting regulatory violations.  Suppose that the agency employs 
numerous inspectors who, when they find what they believe to be violations, 
issue citations.  If a citation is challenged, the agency is responsible for 
resolving whether a violation occurred.  Suppose further that the agency 
learns that inspectors are not issuing citations even when they discover situa-
tions that the agency believes are regulatory violations, but the agency 
believes that the situations are not sufficiently imperative to devote the 
resources to adopt a legislative rule.  The failure of inspectors to cite the 
problematic conduct then means that the conduct does not trigger an adjudi-
catory proceeding.  Essentially, the agency is deprived of any means of 
informing its staff and the public of what it believes constitutes a violation.  
More generally, when the costs of monitoring individual adjudicatory 
outcomes is prohibitive, if an agency cannot issue a guidance document 
directing its inspectors when to issue citations, then pragmatically 
determining whether a particular factual scenario warrants prosecution is left 
to each inspector.  Different inspectors will use their own judgment.  Thus, 
an entity that engages in conduct that one inspector considers a violation 
worthy of prosecution will have to defend itself in court, while another that 
engages in the same conduct may face no ramifications. 
 
party . . . only if—(i) it has been indexed and either made available or published as provided by this 
paragraph; or (ii) the party has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof.”  Id. § 552(a)(2). 
55. See Franklin, supra note 4, at 306 (arguing that too parsimonious a view of exceptions from 
notice and comment for guidance documents will induce agencies to shift to policy making through 
adjudication). 
56. To the extent that investments made prior to announcement of new policy or interpretation 
may be undermined by the change, legislative rulemaking usually would protect reliance interests 
better than guidance documents because of the delay between notice of proposed rulemaking and 
the issuance of a final rule.  But this is merely a silver lining to the cloud of delay inherent in notice-
and-comment proceedings.  Moreover, increased protection of reliance interests by legislative rules 
is somewhat arbitrary in that investments made after the NOPR, although often not in reasonable 
reliance on the old rule, will also be protected by the delay. 
57. See Strauss, supra note 2, at 808 (arguing that citizens are better off knowing the 
instructions central officials give to those implementing the law than if implementation is “remitted 
to the discretion of local agents and to ‘secret law’”). 
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One might think that inconsistency will ultimately be resolved by 
judicial determinations of whether the conduct at issue is a regulatory 
violation.  Such resolution, however, can take many years, and different 
courts might maintain different views about the bounds of the regulatory 
program.  Moreover, if the policy is one of prosecutorial discretion not to 
enforce regulations against some who are technically in violation, then the 
courts will never get the opportunity to opine about the meaning of the regu-
lations and, hence, cannot provide the desired consistency.58  In that 
situation, the ultimate liability of the violator will depend on whether an 
inspector issued a citation, which in turn leaves to the inspector the 
evaluation of whether the matter is worthy of enforcement.  Given that 
inspectors, unlike agency heads, are not generally subject to political 
monitoring, prosecutions might not only be inconsistent, but any policy that 
does emerge also will not be subject to meaningful political oversight.59 
Guidance documents, however, are not a panacea.  Because so little is 
required of the agency before issuing a nonlegislative rule, an agency may 
issue one with no input even from those with strong interests in it.60  Often, 
however, in formulating guidance documents, agency staff perceives value in 
participation by those outside the agency or a need to consult with various 
stakeholders with whom staff interacts on a regular basis.61  But these 
informal channels of participation work best for repeat players—or 
representatives of those with interests that are sufficiently focused—that they 
overcome free-rider problems and other disincentives to organize; groups 
that are neither repeat players nor organized representatives of focused 
interests are apt to be excluded from the formulation process.62  One might 
 
58. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (concluding that agency decisions not to 
bring particular prosecutions generally are exempt from review under the APA because they are 
“committed to agency discretion”). 
59. See Strauss, supra note 2, at 808 (“Agency administration is aided when central officials 
can advise responsible bureaucrats how they should apply agency law.”). 
60. See Asimow, supra note 52, at 574–75 (summarizing how public participation benefits 
rulemaking); Stephen M. Johnson, Good Guidance, Good Grief!, 72 MO. L. REV. 695, 702–03 
(2007) (arguing that public participation is important to prevent capture, provide information to 
agencies, and instill a sense of legitimacy). 
61. See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 200 (4th ed. 2011) (reporting that agencies may seek 
information from interest groups that they believe have superior information); Asimow, supra note 
52, at 575 (explaining that agencies need information gathered through public participation to 
interpret laws and regulations); Mendelson, supra note 7, at 426 (observing that the EPA’s 2003 
Public Involvement Policy seeks to engage the public on proposed policies by encouraging officials 
to reach out to the public). 
62. Mendelson, supra note 7, at 424–25 (arguing that avoiding notice-and-comment procedures 
are more likely to exclude regulatory beneficiaries than regulated entities); William F. West, 
Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic 
Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66, 70 (2004) (observing 
that agency consultation with outside-interest representatives prior to issuing notices of proposed 
rules “was bounded by administrators’ past experience and by their sense of who the significant 
players were”). 
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counter that interested entities will have an opportunity to participate and 
influence the subject of the guidance document before an agency relies on it 
to take action that embodies the policy or interpretation in a rule, order, or a 
prosecution in court.63  But once an agency has committed to guidance, the 
likelihood of participation altering its assessment of whether the guidance is 
worthwhile is small.64  In addition, there are numerous scenarios under which 
such subsequent opportunities to influence the interpretation or policy will 
not arise. 
For example, policy statements are generally not reviewable when 
issued.65  Hence, a regulated entity has to decide whether to refuse to comply 
with the policy announced—saving the compliance costs but risking 
enforcement and a possible penalty for failing to meet statutory or regulatory 
standards.  The alternative is for the entity to comply, bearing the costs of 
doing so but avoiding litigation and penalty costs.66  If the rule is such that all 
regulated entities calculate compliance as the better course, then the policy 
will never be challenged in court, denying the entities and others any 
opportunity to influence the ultimate policy.  Essentially, the policy becomes 
practically binding in that it induces compliance even though it does not 
command independent force of law.67  Even more troubling, an agency might 
exploit the practically binding potential of policy statements to induce com-
pliance with a policy that the agency believes is likely to succumb to political 
or legal opposition were it adopted using notice-and-comment procedures.68 
 
63. Essentially, this is analogous to the point made that even if guidance documents are not 
reviewable when issued, they will be subject to review when applied.  See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 
5, at 1721 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 
(2001), makes the legislative-rule doctrine consistent with agency choice and flexibility by 
providing incentives for using formal procedures in substantively important interpretations). 
64. See Stern, supra note 30, at 597 (“The timing of rulemaking encourages agency lock-in by 
concentrating the bulk of decisionmaking in the pre-notice period.”). 
65. This is consistent with cases reviewing whether issuances of purported policy statements 
are procedurally invalid, because such review addresses whether the statement truly is a guidance 
document.  See, e.g., Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 493 F.3d 207, 228 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(finding that an EPA guidance document was a nonbinding policy statement and that review of such 
was outside the court’s jurisdiction); Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(holding that an EPA guidance document was in fact a legislative rule rather than a policy document 
and that, as such, the EPA was required to comply with the procedural requirements of the APA). 
66. See Johnson, supra note 60, at 703 (identifying the risk that nonlegislative rules might 
become law through exerting a coercive effect on the regulated community resulting in compliance 
or through agencies treating the nonlegislative rules as binding); Jessica Mantel, Procedural 
Safeguards for Agency Guidance: A Source of Legitimacy for the Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 343, 344–45 (2009) (using a hypothetical scenario to illustrate the potential coercive effect 
of guidance). 
67. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 
Fed. Reg. 3432, 3435 (Jan. 25, 2007) (explaining that guidance documents “could affect behavior in 
a way that might lead to an economically significant impact”). 
68. See James T. Hamilton & Christopher H. Schroeder, Strategic Regulators and the Choice of 
Rulemaking Procedures: The Selection of Formal vs. Informal Rules in Regulating Hazardous 
Waste, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 111, 130–32 (hypothesizing that agencies will 
use informal rulemaking to avoid judicial oversight and political cost); Mendelson, supra note 7, at 
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The potential for agency abuse is exacerbated when agencies act to 
relieve regulated entities from regulatory burdens.  Such relief by guidance 
document can cut off all avenues for beneficiary groups seeking increased 
regulatory stringency to pursue judicial reversal of the agency policy or 
interpretation.69  Free from the threat of judicial review, an agency is also 
more apt to exclude representatives of such beneficiaries from the process of 
formulating the policy or interpretation.  Consider, for example, a policy 
statement indicating that an agency intends to refrain from enforcing a statute 
against a class of entities arguably within its purview, because the agency 
interprets the statute not to include that class.  The fallout from this policy 
statement is simply that the agency will not bring enforcement actions 
against entities in this class.  The failure to bring such enforcement actions is 
not an agency proceeding in which those seeking enforcement can 
participate, and, unless the agency’s authorizing statute explicitly provides 
criteria governing the decision to prosecute violations, the decision not to 
enforce is unreviewable under the APA because it is “committed to agency 
discretion.”70  Hence, there is neither an opportunity to provide input into the 
policy up-front nor any means to invoke the judiciary after the fact to keep 
the agency within its statutory bounds. 
II. Procedural Review to Prevent Guidance Document Abuse 
Debate about guidance documents dates back to the enactment of the 
APA.71  In the 1970s, several scholars addressed the use and abuse of these 
documents,72 but the current legal landscape did not emerge until after 
 
408 (concluding that agencies can use guidance documents to “obtain a rule-like effect while 
minimizing political oversight and avoiding the procedural discipline, public participation, and 
judicial accountability required by the APA”). 
69. See Franklin, supra note 4, at 308–09 (asserting that policies that ease potential regulatory 
burdens may be implemented without further judicially reviewable agency action); Mendelson, 
supra note 7, at 420–24 (same). 
70. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–33 (1985). 
71. During the early stages of developing the APA, the final report of the Attorney General’s 
Committee on Administrative Procedure described general statements of policy as follows: 
Most agencies develop approaches to particular types of problems, which, as they 
become established, are generally determinative of decisions. . . .  As soon as the 
“policies” of an agency become sufficiently articulated to serve as real guides to 
agency officials in their treatment of concrete problems, that fact may advantageously 
be brought to public attention by publication in a precise and regularized form. 
ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT 26–27 (1941).  Dissenters from this 
report, however, proposed that “[w]here an agency, acting under general or specific legislation, has 
formulated or acts upon general policies not clearly specified in legislation, so far as practicable 
such policies shall be formulated, stated, published, and revised in the same manner as other rules.”  
Id. at 225 (minority report). 
72. See, e.g., Asimow, supra note 52, at 578 (recommending in 1977 that Congress require 
“postadoption public participation for nonlegislative rules”); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Public 
Procedures for the Promulgation of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy, 64 GEO. 
L.J. 1047, 1061 (1976) (arguing that fairness requires courts to prescribe additional procedures for 
formulating rules and policy). 
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Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC73 prohibited courts from 
mandating procedures in addition to those required by the APA or their 
authorizing statutes.74  Since Vermont Yankee, the debate has focused largely 
on the question of what constitutes a legislative rule, which requires notice-
and-comment proceedings, as opposed to a guidance document, which does 
not.  Loosely speaking, three schools of thought have developed regarding 
review of procedure as a means of resolving the tensions created by the use 
of guidance documents. 
A. Legal Effect and the Distinction Between Legislative Rules and Guidance 
Documents 
The first school to emerge, led by Robert Anthony, was motivated by a 
concern for agency abuse of guidance documents.75  When agencies adopt 
rules with the force of law, they are supposed to use notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.  Often, however, agencies will adopt policy statements or 
interpretive rules that in practice bind regulated entities without following 
notice-and-comment procedures.76  Professor Anthony devoted a good part of 
his scholarship to advocating that courts should police such abuse by 
determining which purported guidance documents actually do create new, 
practically binding law and reversing them on grounds that they are really 
“spurious rules”—legislative rules issued improperly without notice-and-
comment procedures.77 
Anthony advocated different tests to determine whether purported 
policy statements, as opposed to interpretive rules, were spurious rules.78  On 
 
73. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
74. Id. at 543. 
75. See Anthony, supra note 2, at 1317–18 (noting that the ease of issuing guidance documents 
and the ability to avoid public and judicial scrutiny have led agencies to abuse them). 
76. Id. at 1332–55 (detailing numerous examples of guidance documents that Anthony thinks 
should have been adopted as legislative rules, if at all). 
77. See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, Commentary, A Taxonomy of Federal Agency Rules, 52 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (2000) [hereinafter Anthony, Taxonomy] (approving of the invalidation 
of agency documents that obtain binding effect without having gone through notice-and-comment 
procedures); Anthony, Lifting the Smog, supra note 17, at 10 & n.31 (citing cases for the 
proposition that a noninterpretive agency document that is given binding effect will be invalidated if 
it was not issued through the use of legislative rulemaking procedures); Robert A. Anthony, “Well, 
You Want the Permit, Don’t You?” Agency Efforts to Make Nonlegislative Documents Bind the 
Public, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 34 (1992) [hereinafter Anthony, Want the Permit?] (advocating the 
rejection of agency efforts to impose binding obligations on the public through nonlegislative 
documents); Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the 
Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 57–58 (1990) (rebuking agency attempts to bind the public through 
documents that are exempt from public participation requirements).  Courts, especially the D.C. 
Circuit, have been influenced by Anthony’s scholarship.  See, e.g., infra notes 82–84, 98–103 and 
accompanying text. 
78. Compare Anthony, Lifting the Smog, supra note 17, at 11–12 (proposing two key inquiries 
to be made in determining how to categorize a nonlegislative rulemaking document), with id. at 17 
(lauding the four-step test to determine whether an interpretive rule has legal effect, which was set 
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the one hand, a policy statement is an indication of how an agency intends to 
exercise discretion that it is given to implement the statutes and regulations it 
administers.  Policies do not follow from the language of these statutes and 
regulations, but to qualify as a policy statement, the document must not 
definitively identify the manner in which the agency will apply these sources 
of law.79  An interpretive rule, on the other hand, is meant to explain 
preexisting legal obligations and relations that are embodied in the agency’s 
authorizing statutes and regulations.80  Hence, a document is a valid interpre-
tive rule and needs not go through notice and comment if it follows from the 
language it is interpreting. 
1. Statements of Policy.—For a policy statement, the “ex ante legal 
effect” school looks at whether the document was issued with intent to bind 
or otherwise had binding effect.81  Indicia of such bindingness include, most 
importantly, definitive language indicating the course of action the agency 
would take when applying relevant statutes and regulations to particular 
situations.82  Other factors that might indicate sufficient bindingness are 
whether the agency indicated a clear intent to follow the document when 
addressing particular cases, whether the agency published the document in 
the Code of Federal Regulations, and whether the agency expressly indicated 
that the document was meant to be a nonlegislative rule.83 
 
out by Judge Williams in American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Administration, 995 
F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). 
79. See Anthony, Taxonomy, supra note 77, at 1047 (claiming that an agency document that 
establishes fixed criteria for decisions has binding effect and, consequently, cannot be a policy 
statement). 
80. See id. at 1046 (claiming that interpretive rules merely spell out or explain inherent 
substance in the law that is being interpreted). 
81. See Anthony, Want the Permit?, supra note 77, at 34 (arguing that a rule issued with intent 
to bind the public, or that practically does bind the public, is not exempt from notice-and-comment 
requirements); Franklin, supra note 4, at 288–89 (“[A]ll [proposals for reform] of . . . the 
legislative/nonlegislative distinction . . . require courts to divine the substantive nature of a rule—by 
examining its . . . effect.”). 
82. See, e.g., Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Sec’y of Labor, 589 F.3d 1368, 1372 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(highlighting a document’s use of permissive language as indicative of policy statements); 
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that a disclaimer at 
the end of a “guidance” document did not counteract obligations imposed by the document on 
regulators and regulated entities); Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 947 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (holding that language used by an agency to describe action levels indicated that those levels 
had a binding effect); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. ICC, 659 F.2d 452, 463 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that 
policy statements must allow agencies discretion in decision making); see also Anthony, supra note 
2, at 1328–29 (“If the document is couched in mandatory language, or in terms indicating that it will 
be regularly applied, a binding intent is strongly evidenced.” (footnotes omitted)). 
83. See, e.g., Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 493 F.3d 207, 226 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(noting that policy statements have no binding effect and leave decision makers free to exercise 
discretion); Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating that the three 
factors that determine the nature of an agency document are how the document is characterized by 
the promulgating agency, whether the document was published in the Code of Federal Regulations 
or the Federal Register, and whether the document binds the agency or private parties).  Generally, 
courts give little weight to an agency assertion that it intended a document to be guidance.  E.g., 
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A major problem for this ex ante approach is that binding legal force 
comes in many flavors and intensities, and it is not self-evident from the face 
of a policy statement how the agency will apply it in subsequent particular 
situations.  As already noted, virtually everyone accepts that only legislative 
rules can have independent legal force.84  This means that a person who is 
alleged to have violated an agency’s regulatory law must be shown to have 
violated the underlying statute or legislative rule that an agency is 
implementing; it is not sufficient for the agency to demonstrate that the 
person violated a policy statement.85  But Anthony advocates that documents 
that are practically binding should be deemed to be legislative rules as well.86  
This raises the question of what makes a rule practically binding. 
Courts have ruled that a policy statement specifying precisely what a 
regulated entity can do to comply with agency legislative rules is binding.87  
Such a statement poses a dilemma for an entity about whether to comply with 
the announced policy or risk prosecution and potential penalties.  To the 
extent it induces changes in the entity’s conduct, the statement may appear 
sufficiently forceful to be a legislative rule that cannot be promulgated 
without notice and comment. 
Some cases have also focused on the extent to which the agency itself 
will be bound by a purported policy statement in considering whether the 
statement is an invalid legislative rule.88  A policy to which an agency binds 
itself can have an impact even though it does not have independent legal 
force.  For instance, if an agency binds itself to a particular method of eval-
uating applications for a permit, an entity seeking the permit would be 
 
Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1023 (disregarding a “boilerplate” disclaimer at the end of a 
purported EPA “guidance” document). 
84. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
85. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
86. See Anthony, supra note 2, at 1328–29, 1383 (stating that a guidance document is 
practically binding “if the affected private parties are reasonably led to believe that failure to 
conform will bring adverse consequences, such as an enforcement action or denial of an 
application[;] . . . the document is couched in mandatory language, or in terms indicating that it will 
be regularly applied[;] . . . [or] private parties can rely on it as a norm or safe harbor by which to 
shape their actions” (footnotes omitted)). 
87. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 384 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that particular 
directives in an EPA guidance document made the document “purport to bind applicants for 
approval of a risk-based cleanup plan”); Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1023 (holding that the 
result of policies expressed in an EPA guidance document—requiring state regulators to search for 
and replace deficiencies in their monitoring regulations—was to create obligations on the part of 
state regulators and entities regulated by the states).  But see Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 589 F.3d at 1372 
(holding that language was permissive rather than mandatory because the statement used the terms 
“strongly encouraged” and “should” instead of “shall”). 
88. See, e.g., Catawba Cnty. v. EPA, 571 F.3d 20, 34–35 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that an 
agency memo creating a rebuttable presumption that preserved the agency’s discretion did not bind 
the agency, thus freeing the memo from notice-and-comment requirements); Gen. Elec., 290 F.3d at 
385 (vacating a guidance document because it bound the EPA to accept a particular total toxicity 
factor from cleanup-plan applicants); Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 
1997) (noting that a key distinction between a substantive rule and a policy statement is whether an 
agency intends to bind itself to a legal position). 
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inviting rejection of its request were it to ignore the policy statement and 
present its own methodology for evaluating whether it deserved the permit.89  
On the flip side, if an agency commits to refrain from prosecuting conduct 
that arguably constitutes a regulatory violation, it relieves a regulated entity 
from having to change such conduct.  The concern with an agency binding 
itself is that consistent application of these policies essentially signals the 
conduct in which a regulated entity should engage or from which it should 
refrain. 
Any inquiry into bindingness is further plagued by the fact that the 
extent to which an agency can bind itself to follow a policy can vary.  At one 
end of the scale, an agency can follow a policy to the letter in every situation 
to which it is relevant.  An agency, however, can bind itself to a lesser extent, 
for example, by creating a presumption in favor of application of the policy.  
Such a presumption imposes a burden on an entity adversely affected by the 
policy to present arguments sufficient to overcome the presumption.  An 
agency may also rely on the policy as precedent.  Because of the nature of 
arbitrary and capricious review of agency action, administrative precedent is 
not as strong as judicial precedent.  Essentially, precedent merely relieves the 
agency from having to readdress arguments that it already resolved when it 
established the policy.90  But the agency still has an obligation to justify any 
action it takes in terms of statutory and regulatory prescriptions, and 
therefore must remain open-minded to consider arguments about changing 
the policy if those arguments were not previously addressed by the agency.91 
There is yet another notion that complicates any inquiry into whether an 
agency has bound itself: the head of an agency may not intend to bind 
himself to follow a policy in any respect but may intend that agency staff 
follow it in every case.  For example, consider the Secretary of Agriculture’s 
statutory responsibility to promulgate standards for the humane care of 
animals used in research, including the well-being of nonhuman primates.92  
The Secretary has adopted a regulation aimed at ensuring that primates get 
sufficient cognitive and social stimulation, which requires research facilities 
to provide housing in accord with “accepted professional standards as cited 
 
89. See, e.g., Gen. Elec., 290 F.3d at 384 (“To the applicant reading the Guidance Document 
the message is clear: in reviewing applications the Agency will not be open to considering 
approaches other than those prescribed in the Document.”). 
90. See Ronald M. Levin, Nonlegislative Rules and the Administrative Open Mind, 41 DUKE 
L.J. 1497, 1501 & n.17 (1992) (“To the extent that [a policy] statement contains adequate answers 
to the challenger’s contentions, the agency certainly may consult it and cite to it, so long as the 
agency also gives full attention to any issues raised for the first time in the current proceeding.”). 
91. Cf. id. at 1499–502 (arguing from the case law for an administrative “openmindedness” 
obligation).  Administrative precedent may also allow an agency to avoid considering arguments 
that the petitioner could have raised in a prior challenge before the agency but did not.  E.g., NRDC 
v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1063, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (denying petition because a petitioner’s “failure to 
raise a particular question of statutory construction before an agency constitutes waiver”). 
92. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a) (2006). 
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in appropriate professional journals or reference guides.”93  The actual cogni-
tive and social stimulation of a primate may depend on a multitude of 
interacting factors, an important one of which is whether the animal is 
housed with other members of its species.94  The Secretary might issue a 
policy statement instructing its inspectors to institute an enforcement 
proceeding against any facility that houses nonhuman primates in isolation 
from fellow members of its species, and the Secretary may intend that its 
staff follow this statement in every instance.  This statement, however, does 
not necessarily indicate that the Secretary believes that any such facility is in 
violation of his regulation.  The Secretary may want to ensure that his central 
staff has an opportunity to consider whether a particular facility that houses a 
primate in isolation nonetheless is in fact providing sufficient stimulation. 
Without identifying the nature of the legal force that characterizes 
legislative rules, it is impossible for courts to be consistent in determining 
what constitutes sufficient force.  Even applying a consistent notion of legal 
force, a question would remain as to how binding a policy must be before a 
court will deem its announcement to be a legislative rule.  On top of these 
vagaries, a reviewing court ultimately must make a prediction about how the 
agency will treat the policy in the future.  For example, if the essence of a 
legislative rule is independent legal force, a court still must decide whether 
the agency, in subsequent proceedings, will apply the policy as if it has such 
force.95  Unfortunately, when an agency issues a purported guidance docu-
ment, there are no assurances about how the agency will apply it.  The same 
is true for an inquiry into whether an agency will bind itself or whether it will 
require that its staff be bound.  Because the binding-effect approach provides 
no demarcation of the kind of binding force required, the extent of binding 
force required, or how likely the agency must be to apply the statement with 
binding force for a court to conclude that the statement is a legislative rule, 
the resulting judicial decisions are inconsistent and seemingly ad hoc.  The 
doctrine based on bindingness is so confused that courts and commentators 
alike describe the doctrine as engulfed in smog.96 
2. Interpretive Rules.—The picture is slightly clearer for purported 
interpretive rules, although the distinction between interpretive and 
 
93. 9 C.F.R. § 3.81 (2011). 
94. See, e.g., id. § 3.81(a) (“The environment enhancement plan must include specific 
provisions to address the social needs of nonhuman primates . . . .”). 
95. See William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1333–35 
(2001) (reviewing judicial difficulty in predicting how agencies will apply policy statements and 
explaining how agencies game the law by couching definitive statements in tentative language). 
96. See, e.g., Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1029–30 (2d Cir. 1975) (describing the 
distinction between a “[legislative] rule . . . and a ‘general statement of policy’” as “enshrouded in 
considerable smog”); see also Anthony, Lifting the Smog, supra note 17, at 4 n.10 (listing numerous 
cases stating that the distinction between legislative and interpretive rules is not clear); Richard W. 
Murphy, Hunters for Administrative Common Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 917, 924 (2006) (noting “the 
infamously ‘smoggy’ nature of the distinction between legislative and interpretive rules”). 
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legislative rules is still far from pellucid.97  Again, the focus is on whether the 
rule “carries the force and effect of law,”98 but the emphasis for evaluating an 
interpretive rule is whether the binding obligation is created by the rule rather 
than reflecting a preexisting obligation imposed by the statute or regulation 
the rule purports to interpret.99  Operationally, this inquiry looks at the 
relation between the rule and the text it interprets.100  For example, courts 
have stated that a rule is interpretive if it spells out a duty “fairly 
encompassed” within the regulation that the interpretation purports to 
construe.101  The basis for this test is that a rule that is fairly encompassed 
does not create an independent legal obligation, but rather merely clarifies 
one that already exists.  Similarly, courts have held that a rule that is incon-
sistent with, or amends, a legislative rule cannot be interpretive, because such 
a rule would impose new rights or obligations.102  This standard, however, 
still leaves difficult line-drawing choices for determining whether the 
connection between an announced interpretation and the text being 
interpreted is sufficiently close to characterize the announcement as an 
interpretive rule.  In fact, courts often deviate from the strictures of the 
doctrine they have created by holding that interpretations that are clearly not 
encompassed in the language being interpreted were, nonetheless, 
interpretive rules.103 
 
97. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  Courts will 
often characterize guidance documents that are not clarifications of language nonetheless as 
interpretive, and then uphold them even though they are sufficiently definitive that a court almost 
certainly would reverse them were they characterized as policy statements.  See John F. Manning, 
Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 926–27 (2004) (evaluating the D.C. Circuit’s 
method of identifying “procedurally invalid nonlegislative rules” and observing that “the resulting 
inquiry has an air of arbitrariness to it”). 
98. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. FAA, 291 F.3d 49, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). 
99. E.g., Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1337 (11th Cir. 2009) (reasoning that an 
interpretive rule “‘typically reflects an agency’s construction of a statute . . .’ and does not ‘modif[y] 
or add[] to a legal norm’” (alterations in original) (quoting Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 
90, 94–95 (D.C. Cir. 1997))). 
100. Id.  Courts sometimes purport to consider other factors that bear on an agency’s intent to 
create an independent legal obligation, such as whether the agency states that it is invoking its 
legislative rulemaking authority or whether it published the rule in the Code of Federal Regulations.  
E.g., Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  
But in the absence of a telltale indication that the agency intended to invoke its legislative 
rulemaking authority, the relationship of the interpretation to the text being interpreted is 
dispositive.  See Air Transp. Ass’n, 291 F.3d at 55–56 (analyzing an interpretive rule in relation to 
the pertinent statute and concluding that the rule “incorporate[s] both the statutory requirement . . . 
and required rest regulations” and therefore “does not require notice-and-comment rulemaking”). 
101. Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 588. 
102. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1023, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(setting aside an EPA guidance document in part because the guidance document imposes legal 
obligations). 
103. See, e.g., Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1112–13 (holding that Program Policy Letters of 
the Mine Safety and Health Administration are “interpretive rules” even though the court admits 
that it is possible that the Program Policy Letters are “a de facto amendment of prior legislative 
rules”); Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1307–09 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (reasoning that even 
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3. Evaluation of the Legal-Effect School.—As a positive matter, the 
legal-effect school would seem to deprive guidance documents of any 
practical effect, deeming any purported guidance document with such an 
effect to be a spurious legislative rule.104  This seems contrary to notice 
provisions of the APA, which state that an agency cannot use a guidance 
document “against a party”105 unless the document was published in the 
Federal Register or was made available to the public and the party had actual 
knowledge of its terms.106  This implies, however, that an agency can use a 
guidance document against a party if either the publication or notice 
condition is met.  One might argue that this provision, which was added to 
the APA by the Freedom of Information Act,107 was meant to limit the ability 
of agencies to use particular actions against parties and should not be read to 
authorize such use.  But, although the language of the provision may not 
itself authorize use of guidance documents against a party, its structure 
implies an understanding that they could be so used and, hence, potentially 
have some force. 
As a normative matter, focusing on the extent to which a guidance 
document “binds” the public or creates “new law” is neither a manageable 
nor appropriate inquiry for courts because there is no a priori understanding 
of how binding is too binding or how much lawmaking is too much 
lawmaking for a rule to be nonlegislative.108  Given that every guidance 
 
though the EPA’s action had the “effect of creating new duties” beyond the language of the statute, 
the action was nonetheless interpretive because the agency did not “‘intend[] to create new . . . 
duties’” (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984))). 
104. See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. 
105. The relevant language in full reads as follows: 
A final order, opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction 
that affects a member of the public may be relied on, used, or cited as precedent by an 
agency against a party other than an agency only if— 
  (i) it has been indexed and either made available or published as provided by this 
paragraph [in the Federal Register]; or 
  (ii) the party has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof. 
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (2006).  Peter Strauss reads this provision as indicating that guidance 
documents have precedential effect.  See Strauss, supra note 2, at 823–24 (arguing that § 552(a)(2) 
permits an agency to give publication rules the force of precedent by listing them together with 
agency precedent and by describing the permitted effect “in a way that sounds like the treatment of 
precedent”).  John Manning disagrees, noting that the point of the provision was to limit the effect 
of the various actions specified and that the provision does not state that each specified action has 
all of the specified effects.  Manning, supra note 97, at 934–35 & n.207.  Nonetheless, Manning 
agrees that Strauss’s reading is consistent with this provision of the APA.  Id.  More significantly 
for my point, Manning’s argument implies that each of the specified actions, including guidance 
documents, has to have at least one of the specified effects, which means that these documents must 
be capable of being used against a party. 
106. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). 
107. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 90-23, sec. 1, § 552(a), 81 Stat. 54, 54–55 (1967) 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)). 
108. See Gersen, supra note 5, at 1718–19 (proclaiming that the legislative-rule inquiry should 
center on whether notice-and-comment procedures were followed rather than if the rule is “tied 
closely enough to a preexisting regulation,” because doing so would be “unnecessarily difficult”); 
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document will have some effect and will reflect some exercise of agency 
discretion,109 the propriety of issuing the document without engaging in 
notice and comment should turn on balancing the costs and benefits of 
proceeding by nonlegislative rulemaking.  This balance, in turn, hinges on 
such context-specific factors as the interference with reliance interests, the 
importance of information known to stakeholders but not to the agency, the 
benefits from implementing the policy or interpretation quickly, and the 
ability of the agency to devote resources to other action. 
Focusing on the impact of the rule not only asks the wrong question, it 
threatens to invalidate virtually all guidance documents because all have 
some impact regardless of how they are worded or issued.110  The inherent 
incoherence of judicial review under the legal-effect school thus can result in 
judicial reversal of many valuable guidance documents.  Moreover, to avoid 
procedural reversal, agencies will announce more policies and interpretations 
via adjudication, even when advance information about the agency’s views 
would be particularly valuable.111  Hence, those who advocate characterizing 
any rule with practical force as a legislative rule would forfeit guidance 
documents’ compelling administrative benefits by exposing agency action to 
confusing and seemingly arbitrary judicial oversight. 
B. Ex Post Monitoring of Agency Use of Guidance Documents 
The second school of thought on guidance documents developed in 
reaction to judicial doctrine’s incorporation of ideas from the legal-effect 
school.  Fearing that the incoherence of judicial doctrine unduly discourages 
agencies from using guidance documents, and that courts strike down such 
documents even when they are justified, this school advises that courts get 
out of the business of reviewing the procedural adequacy of adoption of pur-
ported guidance documents.  Instead, this school advocates that a rule 
adopted without notice-and-comment procedures should be deemed a policy 
statement or interpretive rule,112 and that courts should monitor the agency’s 
 
Manning, supra note 97, at 926–27  (arguing that judicial inquiry into whether an agency should 
have used notice and comment is judicially unmanageable because no articulable standard 
determines how much agency policy-making discretion should mandate the use of notice and 
comment). 
109. See Gersen, supra note 5, at 1719 (noting that all guidance documents will affect the 
public in some manner, which is why agencies issue them); Strauss, supra note 14, at 1479 
(contending that nonlegislative rules can be argued to have a practical binding effect “in most, if not 
all, cases”). 
110. Presumably, an agency could issue a guidance document that is so ambivalent as to have 
no effect, but then it also would not convey anything about the agency’s current view of the matter 
addressed.  See Funk, supra note 95, at 1335 (noting that an agency’s inclusion of language making 
a policy statement tentative renders the statement useless if taken at face value because it will “not 
communicate any intention at all”). 
111. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text. 
112. See Funk, supra note 5, at 663 (“The simple test, which we will call the ‘notice-and-
comment test,’ is simply that any rule not issued after notice and comment is an interpretive rule or 
statement of policy, unless it qualifies as a rule exempt from notice and comment on some other 
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reliance on these rules to ensure that it does not use them as if they have 
independent legal force.113 
The proponents of ex post monitoring of agency use of guidance 
documents generally have concluded that any ex ante distinction between 
legislative rules and guidance documents is doomed to fail.  They note that a 
rule that clarifies legal ambiguities or fills in statutory or regulatory gaps 
necessarily involves some exercise of discretion that results in a change in 
legal obligations—that is, every guidance document involves some 
lawmaking as opposed to mere law exposition.114  Thus, they see the efforts 
of the legal-effect school as trying to determine, on a case-by-case basis, just 
how much lawmaking as opposed to law exposition is too much to tolerate in 
a nonlegislative rule.  But such determinations are fraught with difficulty 
because they are outside the realm of the judiciary’s institutional 
competence. 
For example, John Manning reasons that such determinations are similar 
to those about how much lawmaking discretion Congress might delegate to 
agencies or about when an agency must make law by rulemaking rather than 
adjudication.115  He notes that the Supreme Court both has explicitly stated 
that the nondelegation doctrine is not judicially administrable and has 
avoided reversing any agency adjudication because the agency should have 
proceeded by rulemaking instead.116  Manning asserts that all three types of 
situations are different from other line-drawing standards that courts 
administer because 
 
basis.”); Gersen, supra note 5, at 1719 (“Rather than asking whether a rule is legislative to answer 
whether notice-and-comment procedures should have been used, courts should simply ask whether 
notice-and-comment procedures were used.”); cf. Elliott, supra note 36, at 1491 (contending that 
when an agency improperly relies upon a rule that was adopted without the proper notice-and-
comment procedure, the rule should be treated like a nonbinding policy statement rather than being 
invalidated in its entirety by the court).  Implicit in this test is that the rule is not otherwise exempt 
from notice-and-comment requirements for other reasons, for example, because the rule is 
procedural or the agency has explicitly availed itself of the good-cause exception.  See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(b) (2006) (exempting from notice and comment “rules of agency organization, procedure, or 
practice” and rules where “the agency for good cause finds [and explicitly states its reasons] that 
notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
interest”). 
113. The D.C. Circuit at one time followed this approach.  E.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. 
Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“The critical distinction between a substantive 
rule and a general statement of policy is the different practical effect that these two types of 
pronouncements have in subsequent administrative proceedings. . . .  A general statement of policy 
. . . does not establish a ‘binding norm.’”).  Some judges occasionally suggest reinstating this 
approach.  See, e.g., Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 950, 951–52 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(Starr, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (lamenting the progress to a multifactor test and 
cajoling the D.C. Circuit to “reembrace” the Pacific Gas test). 
114. See Gersen, supra note 5, at 1714–15 (“Some mechanism is needed to distinguish 
interpretation appropriate for informal settings from interpretation only appropriate for formal 
settings.”); Manning, supra note 97, at 924 (explaining the insight of the Chevron doctrine as 
recognition that interpretation always involves some lawmaking and some law explication). 
115. Manning, supra note 97, at 898. 
116. Id. at 901 (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001)). 
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when one asks a reviewing court to examine whether a legislature or 
agency has adopted a sufficiently precise policy, the inquiry has an 
irreducibly arbitrary feel to it because there is no measure of how 
much precision such an actor should be expected to supply.  In other 
words, courts can make rough judgments about how precise a statute 
or regulation is; they have no basis for determining how precise it 
should be in order to satisfy the fairly abstract duty to make policy 
through a prescribed method.117 
Those in the ex-post-monitoring school do not deny the potential for an 
agency to abuse its discretion by issuing a guidance document when a legis-
lative rule would be more appropriate.  For these scholars, however, the 
check on agency abuse comes when the agency relies on the document in 
subsequent proceedings.118  If the agency resolves a matter by claiming that 
an entity violated a guidance document, the agency will be reversed on judi-
cial review of that subsequent matter because the document can have no 
independent legal force.119  The ex-post-monitoring school would not, 
however, deem the guidance document itself procedurally invalid.  In short, 
under this approach, an agency can claim that a party in an adjudication or 
judicial proceeding that contravenes an interpretation or policy announced in 
a guidance document is violating a statute or legislative rule, but it has to 
prove such a violation, not merely that the party acted contrary to the 
guidance. 
In addition, proponents of ex post monitoring also point out that the 
policy or interpretation announced in a guidance document will ultimately 
have to survive substantive review when an agency’s application in subse-
quent adjudication is challenged.  Thus, an agency will not escape having to 
defend the guidance as being within the agency’s authority and not being 
arbitrary and capricious.120  For challenges to the agency’s statutory 
authority, the agency will face the scrutiny of Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,121 
rather than the more deferential Chevron v. NRDC122 review, if the challenge 
is to the issuance of the guidance document or occurs in a proceeding that 
 
117. Id. at 912 (footnote omitted). 
118. See Elliott, supra note 36, at 1491 (“[I]f an agency says initially that a policy statement is 
not a binding rule and then later treats it as if it were a binding rule by refusing to engage in genuine 
reconsideration of its contents in a subsequent case, a court should invalidate the agency’s action in 
the individual particular case on the basis that the action lacks sufficient justification in the 
record.”). 
119. See Manning, supra note 97, at 930–31 (noting that courts can effectively enforce the 
distinction between legislative and nonlegislative rules by “assigning different legal effects to an 
agency’s application of rules” adopted without notice and comment). 
120. See id. at 932–33 (explaining how review under a reasoned-decisionmaking standard 
would prevent an agency from relying on a guidance document as if it had independent legal force). 
121. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
122. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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does not trigger Chevron review.123  Proponents of ex post monitoring claim 
that this will encourage agencies to use notice-and-comment rulemaking.124  
For arbitrary and capricious challenges, an agency will have to explain in 
light of all relevant factors why it adopted the new policy, including an 
analysis of factual predicates and predictions that ensure to a reviewing court 
that the agency believes the policy or interpretation to be better than 
alternatives, including the original policy that the guidance document 
changed.125  Given that courts will require agencies to address plausible 
stakeholder arguments, such review is likely to provide some discipline of 
agency solicitation of stakeholder input when issuing guidance documents.126 
Some proponents of the ex-post-monitoring approach would also grant 
guidance documents precedential effect.127  Because of the reasoned-
decisionmaking nature of arbitrary and capricious review of agency action, 
allowing guidance documents to have such effect actually constrains, more 
than empowers, agencies.  If guidance documents have precedential force, an 
agency cannot change the interpretation or policy the document announces 
 
123. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 205 n.3 (2004) (reporting that informal pronouncements that are not the 
product of rulemaking or adjudicatory proceedings may not be entitled to Chevron deference but 
may still receive a degree of judicial respect under Skidmore). 
124. See Gersen, supra note 5, at 1720–21 (arguing that the agency incentive to avoid notice-
and-comment procedures is mitigated by the less deferential review that guidance documents 
receive under United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)); cf. Manning, supra note 97, at 
943–44 (concluding that Mead’s rule of reduced deference for interpretations in guidance 
documents is not likely to have a major impact on agencies’ choice of interpretive mode). 
125. The courts have adopted a reasoned-decisionmaking approach to arbitrary and capricious 
review.  See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009) (emphasizing that 
an agency need only have some reasonable justification for its policy changes but that the Court will 
not subject these agency decisions to any more searching review); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (noting that an agency “is obligated to 
supply a reasoned analysis” for policy changes); see also Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: 
The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 
1994 WIS. L. REV. 763, 774 (explaining that under the hard-look doctrine courts “examine an 
agency’s decision to determine whether the agency has explained the basis for its rule”); Mark 
Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of 
Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 483, 491–92 (1997) (describing the 
operational demands of hard-look review); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look 
Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177, 181–82 (describing the development of hard-look review). 
126. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1749, 1761 (2007) (examining the doctrine as applied in the 1970s, and arguing that “the hard 
look doctrine promoted participation by encouraging agencies to respond to criticisms and show 
why they had rejected alternative solutions”); cf. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social 
Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 546 (2002) 
(asserting that hard-look review forces an agency “to take into account perspectives that may be 
held by those with different professional training and whose work might focus on different effects 
of the rule”). 
127. See Manning, supra note 97, at 934–35 (arguing that precedential effect of guidance 
documents follows from the reasoned-decisionmaking requirement of judicial review); Strauss, 
supra note 14, at 1486 (suggesting that provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, included as 
part of the APA, indicate that guidance documents have precedential effect). 
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without justifying that change.128  By the flip side of the reasoned-
decisionmaking requirement, an agency cannot simply rely on interpretative 
or policy precedent to justify an action.129  The agency must address all 
factors that the reviewing court finds relevant given the law and factual 
circumstances surrounding the action.130  To illustrate the significance of the 
limited concept of administrative precedent, consider a challenge to an 
agency action raising arguments that a policy that the agency had adopted in 
a prior proceeding was arbitrary and capricious, or contrary to statute or 
agency regulation.  The challenger raises plausible arguments that the agency 
did not address when it adopted the policy.  If the agency relies on its prior 
adoption of the policy as precedent and thereby neglects to address the new 
arguments, it will not survive the arbitrary-and-capricious challenge.131  The 
precedent does obviate the need for the agency to repeat any collection of 
facts and consideration of arguments it did consider in the first proceeding,132 
but that hardly gives the agency any advantage it did not already have.  The 
agency could always have just repeated the explanation it previously gave for 
the policy in the new proceeding.  In essence, administrative precedent is 
therefore merely a cross-referencing convenience.133  Thus, according to the 
ex-post-monitoring school, the inability of agencies to give guidance docu-
ments independent legal force, along with the prospect of review upon 
application and the limitations imposed by administrative precedent, 
sufficiently constrains agency abuse of such documents. 
 
128. See Manning, supra note 97, at 935–36 (noting that the latitude afforded to agencies to 
reconsider policies adopted in adjudication is limited by the court-imposed reasoned-
decisionmaking requirement that agencies “adhere to their precedents unless they offer a sufficient 
justification for departing from them”). 
129. See id. at 932–34 (illustrating by example that relying on agency precedent is insufficient 
and requires additional reasoning). 
130. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46–47 (reasoning that the decision of the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration to eliminate a motor vehicle safety regulation was arbitrary and 
capricious because the agency did not consider modifying the regulation instead); Seidenfeld, supra 
note 125, at 485 (“[T]he agency cannot know in advance what issues and arguments a reviewing 
court will deem to warrant extended analysis and explanation.”); Sunstein, supra note 125, at 182 
(“The APA does not expressly require identification and consideration of alternatives, as do some 
statutes, but courts have held that it is nonetheless ‘arbitrary’ within the meaning of the APA to 
disregard plausible alternatives.”). 
131. Ignoring a plausible argument would contravene the Supreme Court’s admonition that a 
decision is arbitrary and capricious if it fails to consider relevant factors.  See, e.g., State Farm, 463 
U.S. at 53–54 (holding an agency decision to rescind an automobile-passive-restraint standard 
arbitrary and capricious in part because the agency failed to consider the effect of inertia on the 
likelihood that people would use automatic seatbelts); Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 
F.3d 227, 241 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (reversing the agency because the Commission’s conclusory 
statement that newly submitted data would not provide a convincing argument for modifying the 
analysis underlying its action “provides neither assurance that the Commission considered the 
relevant factors nor a discernable path to which the court may defer”). 
132. See Levin, supra note 90, at 1502 (suggesting that the agency can rely on facts learned 
when it developed the guidance document in defending its application). 
133. Manning, supra note 97, at 934. 
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The ex-post-monitoring approach, however, is far from a perfect 
solution.  As I have described above, many guidance documents are never 
subjected to ex post review.134  Regulated entities face incentives to comply 
with them rather than challenge them ex post, and application of some guid-
ance documents will result in nonenforcement of regulations and statutes.  In 
addition, even if application of guidance documents necessitates an agency 
proceeding that will provide an opportunity for participation for stakeholders 
shut out of the initial guidance formulation, agencies are unlikely to be 
affected by such participation after the guidance is announced.135  Hence, 
despite its procedural simplicity and support from many respected adminis-
trative law scholars over a long period of time, judges have not adopted this 
approach to the task of distinguishing guidance documents from legislative 
rules.136 
C. Balancing Promotion and Discouragement of Guidance Documents 
The most recent entry into the debate on distinguishing legislative rules 
from guidance documents is an article by David Franklin.137  His basic thesis 
rebuts proponents of ex post monitoring, and he ultimately concludes that the 
current judicial approach is both understandable and, overall, good.138  He 
does not ground this conclusion in any conceptual understanding of guidance 
documents, and, in fact, he acknowledges that judicial doctrine is neither 
coherent nor consistent.139  He argues, nonetheless, that this very inconsis-
tency and the uncertainty it generates for agencies about the permissible 
bounds of guidance documents allows courts to tailor their allowance of such 
means of announcing policy and interpretation to circumstances in which it is 
most appropriate.140  Implicit in his argument is a belief that current doctrine 
sends a signal to agencies not to abuse guidance documents while simulta-
neously allowing the agency to use such documents when they are 
warranted.141 
Franklin takes issue with scholars who advocate ex post monitoring, 
arguing that such judicial review is not an adequate safeguard against 
abuse.142  He objects that many such guidance documents have practical and 
even legal effects but are never subject to review because they are not relied 
 
134. See supra notes 65–70 and accompanying text. 
135. See supra note 30. 
136. Franklin, supra note 4, at 294. 
137. Franklin, supra note 4. 
138. Id. at 324–25. 
139. Id. at 278–79. 
140. Id. at 325. 
141. See id. at 324 (contending that under the ex-post-monitoring approach, agencies would 
“too often sidestep the public input that is necessary to protect the interests of regulatory 
beneficiaries, to lay the foundation for meaningful hard-look review, and, more generally, to ensure 
a relatively participatory and accountable form of regulatory governance”). 
142. Id.  Franklin labels the ex-post-monitoring approach as “the short cut.”  Id. at 279. 
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on by agencies to justify reviewable actions.143  Franklin further argues that 
under ex post monitoring, the benefits the agency foregoes by not issuing a 
legislative rule do not provide meaningful incentives for it to prefer notice-
and-comment rulemaking because the agency secures those benefits anyway 
when it applies a nonlegislative rule.144  Finally, Franklin addresses the 
contention that the agency pays a price for foregoing legislative rulemaking 
because, under United States v. Mead Corp.,145 courts afford interpretations 
issued in guidance documents only Skidmore as opposed to Chevron 
deference.146  He questions whether the difference between Skidmore and 
Chevron deference is significant.147  He might also have contended that an 
agency does not sacrifice interpretive deference with respect to issues of 
statutory interpretation because, under the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Services,148 the agency will obtain the higher level of deference if it 
subsequently adopts the same interpretation in rulemaking or formal 
adjudication.149  With respect to interpretation of agency regulations, 
Franklin notes that Mead is irrelevant because courts review such interpreta-
 
143. Id. at 309. 
144. Franklin labels the argument that ex post review will provide incentives for agencies to use 
legislative rulemaking the “trade off.”  Id. at 280.  He concludes that ex post review’s enhancement 
of efficiency does not justify the costs it imposes in terms of denial of public participation.  Id. at 
303–05.  I find some of Franklin’s arguments too dismissive of the costs the agency pays for 
avoiding legislative rulemaking.  In particular, he does not sufficiently appreciate the potential 
burden an agency faces when, without a legislative rule, it is forced to defend the policy repeatedly 
against challenges that raise arguments unaddressed in prior cases or that depend on the particular 
factual circumstances of a party’s dispute.  See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. FERC, 707 F.2d 230, 235 (5th 
Cir. 1983) (reversing the FERC’s refusal to allow Shell new gas prices for “sidetracking” wells, 
because the FERC had not allowed Shell an opportunity to challenge factual assumptions made in 
the case establishing the policy).  Franklin asserts that it is “very difficult for subsequent parties to 
dislodge [policies previously adopted in adjudications],” but cites no support for this proposition.  
Franklin, supra note 4, at 313. 
145. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
146. Id. at 229–30, 234–36. 
147. Franklin, supra note 4, at 321. 
148. 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
149. See id. at 1016 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that one interpretation of the majority’s 
holding is that “judicial decisions [are] subject to reversal by executive officers”).  Justice Scalia 
goes on to illustrate this assertion: 
  Imagine the following sequence of events: FCC action is challenged as ultra vires 
under the governing statute; the litigation reaches all the way to the Supreme Court of 
the United States.  The Solicitor General sets forth the FCC’s official position 
(approved by the Commission) regarding interpretation of the statute.  Applying Mead, 
however, the Court denies the agency position Chevron deference, finds that the best 
interpretation of the statute contradicts the agency’s position, and holds the challenged 
agency action unlawful.  The agency promptly conducts a rulemaking, and adopts a 
rule that comports with its earlier position—in effect disagreeing with the Supreme 
Court concerning the best interpretation of the statute.  According to today’s opinion, 
the agency is thereupon [entitled to Chevron deference and] free to take the action that 
the Supreme Court found unlawful. 
Id. at 1016–17. 
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tions under the extremely deferential Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.150 
standard regardless of the type of action in which the interpretation is 
announced.151 
Essentially, Franklin tries to save current doctrine from the ex-post-
monitoring critique by advocating pragmatic acceptance of the case law, 
defending it without either providing a conceptual foundation or disavowing 
its incoherence.  Unlike the abstract doctrine created by the courts, actual 
case law does not eliminate all uses of guidance documents that have some 
new legal effect.  Instead, for example, some courts creatively find that 
interpretations that do not relate to the language being construed are 
nonetheless clearly encompassed within that language.152  Franklin argues 
that the uncertainty in the case law provides enough “play in the joints” to 
allow agencies to use guidance documents yet also provides a check against 
agency abuse of them.153 
A problem with Franklin’s pragmatic argument stems from the fact that 
the factors that courts consider do not correspond, even in a broad sense, with 
the costs and benefits of issuing guidance.  Thus, the uncertainty in the judi-
cial doctrine does not result from errors in balancing these costs and benefits.  
Such errors would complicate but not negate signals to agencies that guid-
ance documents will be allowed when their use is most appropriate.  
Unfortunately for Franklin, such balancing involves evaluation and compar-
ative weighting of a complex set of value-laden factors; it ultimately requires 
prioritizing the use of agency resources, a task for which courts are particu-
larly ill suited.154  Thus, it is for good reason that courts do not attempt such a 
 
150. 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
151. Franklin, supra note 4, at 322–23.  I agree with Franklin that the entire debate over the 
influence of deference afforded to statutory interpretation seems overemphasized given that the 
difference in deference between the standards is not necessarily great.  See Kristin E. Hickman & 
Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 
1275 (2007) (finding empirically that “Skidmore is relatively deferential as applied by the federal 
courts of appeals,” which accept the agency’s interpretation 60.4% of the time).  Moreover, the 
question of Chevron versus Skidmore deference only arises for agency interpretations of statutes 
rather than regulations, and then only when such interpretations are subjected to judicial review.  Cf. 
Manning, supra note 97, at 943 (concluding that “Mead’s net effect on agency deliberation may 
ultimately be quite small”). 
152. See Manning, supra note 97, at 926–27 (describing several cases in which courts have 
deemed rules interpretive despite the so-called interpretation not being tied to the language being 
interpreted). 
153. Franklin, supra note 4, at 325 & nn.254–55. 
154. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (listing factors that make a 
decision unsuitable for judicial review, including “whether agency resources are best spent on this 
[action] or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular . . . 
action requested best fits the agency’s overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough 
resources to undertake the action at all”); Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in 
Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 716 (1990) (stating that even proponents of broad 
judicial review “concede that the managerial nature of agencies’ decisions about how they can best 
deploy scarce resources warrants considerable solicitude from the courts”); cf. Antonin Scalia, 
Responsibilities of Regulatory Agencies Under Environmental Laws, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 97, 106–07 
(1987) (contending that it is not that courts cannot balance the factors as well as anyone else but 
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balancing.155  Instead, courts look at the attributes of the document that 
suggest it might be binding,156 which is a poor proxy for whether notice-and-
comment procedures are warranted. 
In fact, because judicial doctrine has perversely focused on 
nonlegislative rules’ pragmatic force on those adversely affected, it has 
shortchanged guidance-document benefits.  Not surprisingly, therefore, to the 
extent that judicial doctrine signals any message to agencies, it is to avoid 
guidance precisely when guidance is likely to be most valuable.  Consider, 
first, judicial doctrine about policy statements.  Under current case law, the 
more detailed and definitive the statement, and the more explicitly the 
agency indicates that its staff must follow the policy, the more likely a court 
is to reverse it as a spurious legislative rule.157  But, the more clearly and 
precisely a document states what conduct the agency considers appropriate, 
the more definitely the entity knows whether its planned conduct will prompt 
an enforcement action and, therefore, the more valuable the information 
conveyed by the document.  In short, the legal doctrine today discourages 
agencies from using policy statements precisely when those documents are 
apt to provide the greatest benefit. 
For interpretive rules, the message from the courts is that the weaker the 
link between the interpretation and the text of the statute or regulation being 
interpreted, the less likely a court is to allow the agency to announce the 
 
rather that the balance is inherently political—justifying nonreviewability of regulatory priorities 
and use of resources). 
155. This point, I think, is related to John Manning’s argument that determining the tolerable 
extent of discretionary lawmaking without use of legislative rulemaking procedures is inherently 
judicially unmanageable.  See Manning, supra note 97, at 896–97 (observing that the Supreme 
Court’s “reluctance to impose even a mild rulemaking obligation upon agencies may reflect judicial 
administrability concerns similar to those that deter judges from enforcing the nondelegation 
doctrine”).  Manning’s argument depends on distinguishing this determination from other judicial 
line drawing.  For me, the distinction is the complexity and value-laden nature of the factors that 
courts have to balance to determine for any particular rule whether notice-and-comment procedures 
should have been used.  Manning’s comparison with the nondelegation doctrine is apt because 
judicial enforcement of that doctrine would essentially require courts to prioritize those matters that 
are sufficiently important that they must be addressed by the legislature instead of being delegated 
to an agency.  See id. (“To enforce a meaningful rulemaking requirement, reviewing courts would 
not only have to compel the adoption of rules, but would also have to tell the agency how precise 
such rules must be.  Such analysis would closely approximate that which the Court has refused to 
take on in the nondelegation context . . . .”).  The nondelegation issue too can be characterized as 
involving judicial prioritizing of a political branch’s use of its resources. 
156. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 382–83 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (stating that an 
administrative rule is legally binding if either its language appears binding on its face or if the rule 
is implemented as binding by the agency); see also Funk, supra note 95, at 1326–31 (listing several 
factors courts have considered in determining whether a rule is “legally binding” and thus subject to 
notice-and-comment procedures). 
157. Compare, e.g., Gen. Elec., 290 F.3d at 383–85 (striking down an EPA rule as legislative 
because it contained mandatory language requiring specific behavior from the agency and regulated 
entities), with Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 601 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(upholding a rule as nonlegislative because its nonexclusive list of “broad, general, [and] elastic” 
factors for agency staff to consider was discretionary). 
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interpretation by guidance document.158  But it is not particularly valuable for 
an agency to inform the public that it is adopting an obvious interpretation, as 
the public will assume this interpretation absent notice to the contrary.  
Assuming the interpretation is substantively valid,159 it is precisely those 
interpretations that follow less obviously from the text about which regulated 
entities need to know. 
Finally, judicial focus on proper procedures for guidance documents is 
much ado about nothing.  Striking down a purported guidance document on 
procedural grounds does not stop the agency from subsequently applying the 
interpretation or policy the rule announced.  As long as the interpretation or 
policy is substantively valid, the agency could implement it without the bene-
fit of the guidance document.  For example, an agency with adjudicatory 
responsibility could adopt the guidance in a subsequent adjudicatory 
proceeding.160  Hence, declaring a guidance document procedurally invalid 
merely stops the agency from revealing to the public its intent to apply the 
policy or interpretation. 
 
158. See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, 
Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
528, 530–31 & nn.2–3 (2006) (arguing that agencies engage in strategic substitution, trading 
administrative costs for increased judicial deference when facing strained “textual plausibility,” 
because “courts often give an agency more substantive latitude when the agency promulgates an 
interpretive decision via an elaborate formal proceeding than when it announces its interpretation in 
a more informal context”). 
159. The less the interpretation follows from the language being interpreted, the more likely it 
is that a court will find it to be a substantively invalid interpretation.  Cf. id. at 537–39 (suggesting 
that courts take the “textual plausibility” of statutory interpretations into consideration when 
deciding whether to uphold agencies’ interpretations).  But if the interpretation is not substantively 
valid, then the agency may not adopt it regardless of the mode used for the adoption.  See Nat’l 
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1004 (2005) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (observing that courts would not apply Chevron even when reviewing some formal 
proceedings “because Congress intended not to leave the matter up to the agency”). 
160. Ironically, this is the most salient point of the cases that Franklin analyzes to support his 
argument that ex post review provides little incentive for agencies to refrain from using guidance 
documents.  Franklin, supra note 4, at 313–16.  Both cases involved challenges to agency 
applications of interpretations announced in rules adopted without notice and comment.  See Shalala 
v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 90 (1995) (evaluating a Medicare reimbursement guideline 
adopted without notice and comment); United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 580 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (evaluating a movie-theater quantitative-viewing-angles requirement under the ADA 
adopted without notice and comment).  In both cases the reviewing courts held that interpretive 
rules were adequate because the agency could have proceeded by adjudication.  See Shalala, 514 
U.S. at 96–97 (“The APA does not require that all the specific applications of a rule evolve by 
further, more precise rules rather than by adjudication.”); Cinemark, 348 F.2d at 580 (reasoning that 
the choice between rulemaking and adjudication is within agency discretion).  In essence, these 
holdings reflect the understanding that striking down a guidance document for failure to use notice-
and-comment proceedings would be fruitless because the agency would still be able to adopt the 
interpretation in the particular case.  And given that the courts upheld the interpretations in both 
cases as ones that the agency could have adopted for the first time in the very case under review, 
they represent laudatory use of guidance documents to give parties notice and to assure consistency 
of the interpretations rather than springing them by surprise on regulated entities in enforcement 
proceedings. 
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A closely analogous point was the basis for the plurality opinion in 
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.161  That case involved an interpretation of the 
National Labor Relations Act that the Board announced in an unfair-labor-
practice proceeding against the Excelsior Underwear Company.162  Because 
the interpretation changed the Board’s prior reading, and because the 
company had no reason to know that the Board would adopt the new 
interpretation, the Board declined to apply it to Excelsior;163 understandably, 
Excelsior did not appeal the Board’s order.  A few months later, however, the 
Board applied the new interpretation to Wyman-Gordon, citing the 
“Excelsior rule.”164  A four-member plurality of the Supreme Court con-
cluded that because the announcement of the interpretation was applied 
prospectively only, it was a rule and therefore invalid because the agency had 
failed to use rulemaking procedures.165  The plurality reasoned, however, that 
the procedural invalidity of the prior adoption of the interpretation did not 
stop the Board from applying the interpretation to Wyman-Gordon in its 
adjudicatory proceeding.166  In addition, four other Justices indicated that had 
the NLRB evaluated the matter based on the particular facts of the Wyman-
Gordon case and remained open to arguments about whether the Excelsior 
rule was improper, they would have voted to uphold the agency even if the 
order in Excelsior was procedurally invalid.167  Analogous reasoning would 
allow an agency to apply an interpretation or policy in a particular adjudica-
tion even if courts had previously struck down a guidance document 
announcing that interpretation or policy on procedural grounds. 
There are some circumstances when invalidating a purported guidance 
document on procedural grounds might constrain an agency from adopting 
 
161. 394 U.S. 759 (1969). 
162. Id. at 761–62 (plurality opinion). 
163. Id. at 763. 
164. Id. at 766. 
165. Id. at 764–66. 
166. Id. at 766. 
167. Three Justices concurred, deeming the Board’s procedures in Excelsior proper because the 
resulting “rule” was really just an interpretation validly announced as part of an order.  Id. at 767–
70 (Black, J., concurring).  The concurrence did object to the plurality holding the Excelsior 
decision procedurally deficient while still allowing the Board to rely on it.  Id.  But the 
concurrence’s objection hinged on the fact that the interpretation “was not adopted as an incident to 
the decision of a case before the agency.”  Id. at 769–70.  Had the Board simply imported its 
reasoning from Excelsior to explain why its interpretation was appropriate in the context of the 
Wyman-Gordon case, presumably the concurrence would not have leveled this objection.  Justice 
Douglas dissented because he deemed the Excelsior rule to have been adopted by improper 
procedures and believed that prevented the Board from relying on it.  Id. at 776–77 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting).  But he clearly states that had “the Board decided to treat each case on its special facts 
and perform its adjudicatory function in the conventional way, we should have no difficulty in 
affirming its action.”  Id. at 775–76.  Only Justice Harlan would have prohibited the Board from 
adopting the Excelsior interpretation unless it did so by rulemaking, and then only because he 
deems such rulemaking necessary “where, as here, [the Board] has previously recognized that the 
proposed new rule so departs from prior practices that it cannot fairly be applied retroactively.”  Id. 
at 783 n.2 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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the policy except by rulemaking.  Recall that some courts have held that, in 
adjudication, an agency may not retroactively apply a change to a long-
standing contrary interpretation on which stakeholders may legitimately have 
relied.168  These courts have expressed concerns about agencies applying 
interpretations unfairly—that is, in a manner that stakeholders could not 
foresee.169  Presumably a guidance document giving regulated entities notice 
of the new interpretation before it is applied would alleviate the courts’ 
concerns in such cases.  The agency will therefore be able to apply the new 
interpretation without going through a notice-and-comment proceeding only 
if it can provide notice in the form of a guidance document.170  Striking down 
the guidance document on procedural grounds arguably precludes the agency 
from relying on that document to provide the notice that permits it to change 
its long-standing interpretation.  I use the word arguably quite consciously, 
however, because one might counter that a procedurally invalid statement 
provides the same notice that the agency intends to change its interpretation 
as one that is procedurally valid.171  To state this point another way, if the 
point of restricting the agency from announcing the new policy in adjudica-
tion is to prevent surprise that undermines investment made under the old 
interpretation, a procedurally invalid interpretive rule eliminates the surprise 
as effectively as a valid one.  Essentially, once the agency indicates that it 
intends to change the interpretation, by whatever means, the change is no 
longer a surprise.172  In other words, striking a guidance document for proce-
 
168. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text. 
169. See, e.g., Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 269 F.3d 1098, 1109–10 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (describing 
how D.C. Circuit case law developed into a test that essentially “boil[s] down to a question of 
concerns grounded in notions of equity and fairness” (quoting Cassell v. FCC, 154 F.3d 478, 486 
(D.C. Cir. 1998))). 
170. Even this is not true if courts allow agencies to announce new policies and interpretations 
in adjudications but apply them prospectively only.  See, e.g., Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio v. 
NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1100–03 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (upholding the NLRB’s new interpretation of an 
existing rule but reversing the NLRB’s decision to give retroactive effect to its new interpretation).  
Such a tactic eliminates the fair-notice concern, leaving the agency free to announce any 
substantively valid new policy or interpretation by adjudication rather than by guidance document. 
171. Admittedly, this seems to provide an agency with the benefits of the action that was 
procedurally invalid, which might prompt courts to deny that invalid rules can provide such notice.  
Cf. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 769–70 (Black, J., concurring) (criticizing the plurality for giving 
effect to an invalidly adopted policy and thereby undermining the procedural provisions of the 
APA); id. at 776 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that the plurality allows “the Board [to] ‘have its 
cake and eat it too’”); id. at 781 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (claiming that the plurality decision 
trivializes the rulemaking procedures of the APA). 
172. If a court credits the invalid rule as giving notice of the change, then the reliance issue 
becomes one of the substantive wisdom of applying the new interpretation without sufficient lead 
time, which may be grounds for a court to reverse the application as arbitrary and capricious.  See 
Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (reasoning that an agency interpretation 
“that does not take account of legitimate reliance on prior interpretation . . . may be ‘arbitrary, 
capricious [or] an abuse of discretion’” (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006))).  Hence, courts can protect reliance interests even if they follow the 
suggestion of this Article to substitute substantive for procedural review of guidance documents. 
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dural invalidity would seem to further neither the purpose of discouraging 
agency abuse nor protecting legitimate reliance interests. 
III. Prior Proposals to Mitigate Abuse of Guidance Documents 
Thus far, my discussion indicates that there are both conceptual and 
practical problems with the legal-effect school and the defense of current 
doctrine’s imperfect embodiment of that school.  At the same time, the 
discussion also reveals that critics of the ex-post-monitoring school are 
correct that it would allow an agency to shut stakeholders out of the process 
of formulating guidance documents that have significant impact on them and 
leaves substantial leeway for agencies to abuse the use of guidance 
documents.  Therefore, a direct comparison between the various schools on 
whether courts should review agency procedure for issuing guidance docu-
ments depends crucially on an empirical question for which there is no good 
answer: whether the benefits of guidance documents that are forfeited under 
current doctrine exceed the detriments of restricted stakeholder participation 
and opportunities for judicial review that flow from the ex-post-monitoring 
approach.  Perhaps not surprisingly, several scholars have turned toward 
other means of mitigating guidance-document abuse.  All, however, suffer 
because they still rely on procedural fixes that, although they have implica-
tions for substantive review of guidance documents, insufficiently address 
stakeholders’ interests in knowing whether such a document is substantively 
valid when issued. 
Two relatively recent articles propose solutions that transcend the 
debate about what constitutes a guidance document and warrant careful 
evaluation.173  Liz Magill suggests that courts demand that agencies explain 
the choice of procedural mode by which they make policy.174  She explains 
that other discretionary agency decisions are subject to review under a 
reasoned-decisionmaking standard, which requires that the agency explain its 
choices and in the process demonstrate that it considered all factors that are 
relevant to its decision.175  She points out that current doctrine does review 
agency choice of mode for abuse of discretion but does not demand an 
explanation by the agency.176  Instead, courts have independently evaluated 
 
173. Magill, supra note 6; Mendelson, supra note 7. 
174. Magill, supra note 6, at 1414, 1446–47 (noting that an agency is not required to “supply a 
reasoned decision for its discretionary choice” of form and arguing that judicial review “could be 
effective in responding to” strategic choice of form by demanding a reasoned explanation).  Magill 
does not limit her discussion to use of guidance documents; she addresses all choices of procedural 
mode, including the choice between legislative rules and adjudication.  Id. at 1438–39.  Her 
proposal to allow judicial review of choice of mode, although not explicit, is implicit in her 
arguments that judicial avoidance of such review is out of sync with judicial review of discretionary 
choices generally and her refutation of all possible normative justifications for treating agency 
choice of mode differently.  Id. at 1416–25. 
175. Id. at 1413–15. 
176. Id. at 1415. 
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whether use of a particular mode is fair, and in the process have allowed 
agencies wide leeway to announce policy by adjudication.177 
Magill’s proposal is attractive on its face.  It would direct the courts to 
focus on the relevant choice—the use of a guidance document rather than 
legislative rulemaking.  Forcing the agency to explain this choice would do 
much to induce the agency to think about it more explicitly, and unpersuasive 
explanations might be a means for courts to ferret out illegitimately 
motivated uses of guidance documents.178 
Nina Mendelson has suggested that Congress amend the APA to allow 
stakeholders to petition agencies to amend or repeal a guidance document 
with which they do not agree.179  The agency would have six months to 
respond to such a petition, and its response would be judicially reviewable on 
grounds that it was arbitrary and capricious.180  Moreover, to avoid an agency 
getting bogged down in multiple successive petitions, upon receipt of one 
petition, the agency could notice the matter and seek input from any others 
who have an interest in the guidance document.181  Finally, to avoid forcing 
an agency to devote resources to a matter that does not warrant them, the 
agency can decline the petition by arguing that the submission does not 
require a substantive response.182 
Mendelson’s suggestion also has facially attractive aspects.  It would 
explicitly provide an avenue for participation in the guidance decision for 
any stakeholder willing to take the trouble to petition for agency 
reconsideration, albeit an avenue that would open after the agency has 
initially decided the matter.  It would also provide a record consisting of 
material placed before the agency by petitioners for amendment and those 
who respond to an agency call for input, as well as the material on which the 
agency relied to formulate its response to the petition.  Thus, it seems to cir-
cumvent the denial of participation and the need to review an action with no 
public record before the court. 
More careful reflection, however, reveals three problems common to 
both Magill’s and Mendelson’s suggestions: first, any avenue for 
 
177. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text. 
178. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 553–
55 & n.283 (1985) (explaining how hard-look review can “ferret out” an agency relying on 
illegitimate motives); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1569–70 (1992) (explaining how reasoned-decisionmaking review can 
identify decisions motivated by capture); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 469 (1987) (“The inquiry into arbitrariness is best understood as a means 
of ‘flushing out’ both serious errors of analysis and impermissible motivations for administrative 
behavior.”). 
179. Mendelson, supra note 7, at 438–44.  This is only one of several “more palatable” 
solutions suggested by Mendelson, but it is the one that she identifies as having the most promise.  
Id. 
180. Id. at 439–41. 
181. Id. at 439. 
182. Id. 
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stakeholders in a guidance matter to obtain review is uncertain; second, the 
very act of defending judicial challenges would likely mire the agency down 
and thereby significantly discourage appropriate use of guidance documents; 
third, assuming that stakeholders ultimately could obtain judicial review of 
guidance documents on grounds specified in these proposals, courts would be 
unlikely to impose sufficiently stringent review to deter or correct agency 
misuse of guidance. 
The first problem stems from the courts’ propensity to dismiss claims 
seeking review of guidance documents because they are not final or ripe for 
review.183  Because ultimately both Magill’s and Mendelson’s proposals 
depend on the availability of judicial review, this propensity threatens to 
stymie each proposal.  Because these problems also apply to my proposal 
advocating immediate judicial review of the substance of guidance 
documents, I will delay my detailed exposition of how courts should change 
applications of finality and ripeness to nonlegislative rules until I discuss my 
proposal.184  For now, it suffices to note that the justiciability problems 
facing challenges to guidance documents run into trouble because courts 
hesitate to review such documents prior to applications that might reveal 
more about their impact.185  Hence, under finality doctrine, guidance docu-
ments may not alter legal rights and obligations.186  Under ripeness doctrine, 
they create no legally cognizable hardship for regulated entities because they 
do not provide an independent standard of conduct for which such entities 
can be punished.187  By the converse, courts may find that regulatory 
beneficiaries suffer no hardship because guidance documents do not create 
an independent legal threat that will alter the behavior of regulated entities 
 
183. See Funk, supra note 95, at 1335–41 (citing multiple cases in which courts declined 
petitions to review guidance documents based on the courts’ findings that the documents were not 
final or ripe for review). 
184. See infra subpart IV(A). 
185. See, e.g., Aulenback, Inc. v. Fed. Highway Admin., 103 F.3d 156, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(concluding that even though an interpretive rule appeared to conflict with the authorizing statute, 
the rule was not ripe for review because the agency “might decline to follow the [rule’s] language”); 
ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1577–78 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (proclaiming that the abstractness of 
interpretive rules that have not yet been applied makes them difficult to judicially challenge); Ark. 
Power & Light Co. v. ICC, 725 F.2d 716, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding a policy statement unripe 
for review because its aim was not to set binding legal norms). 
186. See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d 798, 808 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006) (following the established principle that courts “lack authority to review claims under the 
APA ‘where an agency merely expresses its view of what the law requires of a party, even if that 
view is adverse to the party’” (quoting Indep. Equip. Dealers Ass’n v. EPA, 372 F.3d 420, 427 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Indep. Equip. Dealers, 372 F.3d at 427 
(reasoning that an interpretation in an EPA letter was not final agency action because it did not 
announce a change in regulations and had no binding effect). 
187. See Molycorp, Inc. v. EPA, 197 F.3d 543, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that a policy 
statement was not ripe for review because any enforcement would be based on the underlying 
regulation and hence the petitioner was no worse off for the EPA having issued the statement). 
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whose conduct harms beneficiaries.188  Because Magill and Mendelson do 
not explicitly address these barriers to justiciability, their proposals are 
incomplete. 
The second problem facing both Magill’s and Mendelson’s proposals is 
the likelihood that they will unduly bog down the issuance of guidance 
documents.  Guidance documents are issued by officials at a multitude of 
levels of the agency hierarchy,189 and agencies issue tens of thousands of 
them a year.190  Under Magill’s approach, an agency would have to explain 
why it chose to use the guidance mode to announce the policy or 
interpretation.191  This adds an additional consideration to the issuance of 
every document, even those issued by field-office staff.  For those from 
which the agency does not derive substantial benefit (but from which the 
public might), the agency is likely simply to forego announcing the policy or 
interpretation, leaving the matter to the vagaries of ad hoc decisions of its 
low-level investigators.  This might be desirable if those documents that the 
agency simply did not issue were likely to be those which were substantively 
invalid.  But, the correlation between an agency’s willingness to jump 
through the hoop of explaining use of a guidance document and the validity 
of the document would be imperfect.  While the costs of explanation may be 
greatest for those guidance documents that reflect agency abuse, the benefits 
to the agency using nonlegislative rules—saving on the devotion of resources 
and potentially sidestepping substantive review—may be greatest when the 
policy is invalid.  Without some criteria to limit Magill’s requirement of an 
explanation to those guidance documents whose overall impact warrants 
devotion of attention to the agency choice of mode, Magill’s proposal is 
likely to deter both good and bad uses of guidance. 
Mendelson’s proposal avoids some of the problems of added burdens on 
agencies by restricting itself to those guidance documents that generate peti-
tions for amendment or repeal.  But, her proposal would mandate that, to 
avoid having to respond to successive petitions, the agency conduct what 
 
188. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 940 F.2d 679, 683 (D.C. Cir. 
1991) (deciding that a policy statement was not ripe for review because its lack of legal force meant 
that a regulated party could not change its conduct under the policy until it secured an exemption 
through future rulemaking or licensing proceedings); NRDC v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 166 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (declaring that the fact that a policy statement may create uncertainty about legal 
requirements or prompt an entity to challenge the policy when applied is not sufficient hardship to 
make the statement ripe for review). 
189. See Strauss, supra note 14, at 1467–68 (describing rules issued by staff other than the 
agency head that might affect later agency decisions in particular cases). 
190. See Mantel, supra note 66, at 353 (observing that one agency alone issues thousands of 
guidance documents annually); Strauss, supra note 14, at 1469 (describing the “extraordinary 
volume” of publication rules and hypothesizing even greater volume of guidance documents that are 
not published in the Federal Register). 
191. See Magill, supra note 6, at 1404–05 (asserting that courts’ current practice of not 
requiring agencies to explain their choice of policy-making form is incongruent with the rest of 
judicial agency-review doctrine). 
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amounts to a full-fledged notice-and-comment-type proceeding.192  The 
agency would have to notice the petition for amendment and allow those who 
have an interest in the matter to submit their petitions and, presumably, 
comments both in opposition and support of the current guidance.193  This 
would then be substantively reviewable based on the record of such submis-
sions under the accepted reasoned-decisionmaking standard courts apply to 
legislative rules adopted after notice and comment.194  Most troubling, simply 
by petitioning essentially for reconsideration of a guidance document, a 
private stakeholder could commit the agency to a very costly and time-
consuming process akin to a notice-and-comment rulemaking.195  Given the 
limited resources available to agencies, I suspect that many would instruct 
their staff members to avoid issuing guidance documents unless the agency 
deemed the guidance to be absolutely necessary.  The likely losers under 
such a mechanism would be those who most desire notice of agencies’ likely 
future actions in implementing a statute or regulation. 
To her credit, Mendelson anticipates this criticism, and admits that her 
proposal could be costly.196  She tries to hedge against costly abuse by 
stakeholders by allowing an agency to argue that the petition does not 
warrant a substantive response.197  The trouble with this hedge is that it 
would encourage courts to affirm an agency’s rejection of a petition for 
reconsideration without meaningful review of the substance of the announced 
policy or interpretation because courts generally avoid involving themselves 
in prioritizing agency use of resources.198 
This trouble segues into the third problem with the Magill and 
Mendelson approaches—they are unduly optimistic that courts would 
provide meaningful review of the agency choice of mode or the rejection of a 
petition for amendment or repeal.  Because the decision to proceed by guid-
 
192. Mendelson, supra note 7, at 439 & n.223. 
193. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b)–(c), (e) (2006) (requiring agencies to give notice of proposed 
rulemaking, opportunity for comment, and the right to petition for amendment). 
194. Mendelson, supra note 7, at 440. 
195. Courts have been reluctant to allow petitioners to force an agency to commence a notice-
and-comment rulemaking by petitioning directly for legislative rulemaking under § 553(e).  See 
Cellnet Commc’n, Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d 1106, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that judicial 
deference to an agency’s refusal of petitions to commence rulemaking is “so broad as to make the 
process akin to non-reviewability”); WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(applying an extremely deferential standard of review to an agency decision to deny petitions for 
rulemaking because that decision “‘is inevitably based, in large measure, on factors not inherently 
susceptible to judicial resolution’” (quoting NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979))); 
see also Stephanie Tai, Three Asymmetries of Informed Environmental Decisionmaking, 78 TEMP. 
L. REV. 659, 695 (2005) (“[A]n agency’s denial of the petition is subject to a very deferential 
standard of review.”). 
196. Mendelson, supra note 7, at 441 (recognizing that such costs might be “overwhelming”). 
197. Id. at 439. 
198. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (attributing the general unsuitability of 
agency inaction for judicial review in part to each agency’s unique capacity to determine whether 
taking a proposed action would align with its resources and priorities). 
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ance document reflects an agency’s consideration of priorities for its limited 
resources, courts are not likely to provide sufficiently stringent review to 
detect agency abuse of guidance documents. 
This problem is illustrated by the body of cases in which courts have 
reviewed agency denials of petitions for the agency to commence a 
rulemaking proceeding.  Although such petitions are explicitly authorized by 
the APA,199 they are immediately reviewable.200  The ground for review 
usually is that the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or abused its 
discretion in refusing to commence the proceeding.201  But, unlike the usual 
judicial review under that standard, courts have applied a less stringent stan-
dard of review—cognizant that an agency’s decision not to regulate reflects 
its determination that regulation is not of sufficient priority to warrant agency 
attention.202  On occasion, a petitioner is successful in getting a court to force 
an agency to engage in legislative rulemaking but only when the petitioner 
can point to evidence that Congress expected the agency to address the 
matter underlying a petitioner’s desire for a rule.203  Essentially, courts 
recognize that commencing a rulemaking proceeding commits the agency to 
devote significant resources to adoption and implementation of a rule that it 
might think better used to address a different problem within the agency’s 
regulatory ambit. 
Mendelson simply elides this judicial reluctance, asserting that review 
of an agency refusal to modify or repeal a guidance document would involve 
application of the usual reasoned-decisionmaking standard of review.204  But, 
her explicit recognition of the need for the agency option of explaining that 
the petition does not warrant a substantive response belies her assertion that 
the standard of review courts apply to such a refusal should be the same as 
that for substantive review of a legislative rule. 
 
199. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006) (granting interested parties the right to petition an agency to 
issue a rule). 
200. Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007) (recognizing that an agency’s denial 
of a rule-issuance petition is subject to judicial review). 
201. See, e.g., Chaney, 470 U.S. at 854 (Marshall, J., concurring) (reasoning that agency 
inaction is subject to review on the grounds that it was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion, “unless Congress has manifested a clear and convincing intent to preclude review”). 
202. See NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1052–53 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting that denials of 
petitions for adoption of a rule are entitled to special deference even after an agency has seen fit to 
commence a notice-and-comment proceeding); cf. Prof’l Pilots Fed’n v. FAA, 118 F.3d 758, 763–
64 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (explaining that a “more deferential standard of review is indicated, however, 
only when [an] agency has clearly shown that ‘pragmatic considerations’ would render the usual 
and somewhat more searching inquiry problematic because ‘the agency has chosen not to regulate 
for reasons ill-suited to judicial resolution, e.g., because of internal management considerations as 
to budget and personnel or for reasons made after a weighing of competing policies’” (quoting 
Bargmann v. Helms, 715 F.2d 638, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1983))). 
203. See, e.g., Iowa ex rel. Miller v. Block, 771 F.2d 347, 351, 355 (8th Cir. 1985) (ordering the 
Secretary of Agriculture to commence a rulemaking where failure to do so would thwart “the clear 
intent of Congress to establish a program”). 
204. Mendelson, supra note 7, at 440. 
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Magill addresses courts’ reticence to interfere with agency prioritization 
of resources but argues that unlike review of decisions whether to commence 
a rulemaking proceeding, choice of mode for announcing policy or interpre-
tations does not involve agency priorities.205  She contends that the fact that 
the agency has already acted indicates that it has already established that the 
matter is one warranting agency attention.206  But this response ignores the 
fact that different procedural modes involve vastly different resource 
commitments.  The agency has to balance those commitments against how 
much it desires a policy as part of choosing the mode by which it will 
announce it.  For example, an agency might decide that one of its existing 
policies is unwise and should be changed.  Because of reliance interests, 
however, the agency might not want to change the policy by adjudication 
and, in fact, such interests might prompt courts to prohibit the agency from 
using adjudication to announce the change.207  But the policy may only affect 
a handful of people on an issue of slight importance to the agency.  An 
agency in that situation would most likely change the policy by guidance 
document but almost certainly would not convene a legislative rulemaking. 
A real-world example illustrates that agency choice of mode involves 
agency priorities and resource constraints.  The example stems from an 
interpretive rule issued by the FAA declaring that a guide who takes hunters 
to remote areas by plane for pay and provides commercial air transportation 
must have a commercial pilot’s license.208  This interpretation, which 
reversed an existing interpretation by an FAA regional office, affected a 
handful of professional hunting guides in Alaska.209  The D.C. Circuit 
reversed this interpretive rule, holding that agencies may not change long-
standing interpretations by interpretive rule.210  If Magill’s understanding of 
agency priorities were correct, the FAA would have simply convened a 
rulemaking, which might take some time but clearly would allow it to impose 
its new interpretation.  It never has and probably never will because the cost 
to the agency of instituting a notice-and-comment rulemaking is not worth 
the benefit the agency sees from the new interpretation. 
There is also empirical evidence suggesting that Mendelson’s proposal 
would have little effect on agency misuse of guidance documents.  Currently, 
§ 553(e) of the APA gives any “interested person the right to petition for the 
issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”211  Because guidance documents 
clearly are rules under the APA, and the language and structure of § 553 in 
 
205. Magill, supra note 6, at 1422. 
206. Id. 
207. See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text. 
208. The interpretive rule and the judicial reaction to it are described in Alaska Professional 
Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1033–36 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
209. Id. at 1033. 
210. Id. at 1034–36. 
211. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006). 
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its entirety clearly indicates that § 553(e) applies to guidance documents,212 
the APA already seems to permit what Mendelson’s proposal seeks.213  If 
Mendelson’s proposal truly would be an effective way for regulatory benefi-
ciaries to hold agencies more accountable for guidance documents, one 
would expect to see many such petitions by beneficiaries and numerous cases 
in which petitioners seek review of a denial of those petitions.  In fact, there 
are only two reported cases addressing claims seeking judicial review of 
denials of modification of guidance documents.214 
Mendelson asserts that § 553(e) does not apply to guidance documents.  
Arguing that § 553 is not a paradigm of clarity, she claims that “the few 
courts to opine on the issue have flatly and unanimously [agreed].”215  She 
cites three of these opinions.216  But they are hardly sufficient to support her 
claim that the inapplicability of § 553(e) has been judicially resolved.  Only 
one of those decisions was by a court of appeals, and in that case the 
statement arguably was dicta.217  In one of the two district court cases, the 
 
212. Subsection 553(a) provides that “[t]his section [entitled “Rule making”] applies, according 
to the provisions thereof.”  Id. § 553(a).  It then exempts certain matters relating to military and 
foreign affairs and management of personnel and property from all of § 553.  Id.  Subsection 553(b) 
requires an agency to provide notice of proposed rulemaking, but exempts guidance documents 
from “this subsection.”  Id. § 553(b).  Subsection 553(c) provides that “[a]fter notice required by 
this section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to [file comments on the 
proposed rulemaking].”  Id. § 553(c).  Because notice is not required for guidance documents, there 
is a consensus that the comment requirement in subsection (c) does not apply to such documents.  
See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL, supra note 19, at 28 (“Subsections (a) and (b) of § 4 must be 
read together because the procedural requirements of subsection (b) apply only where notice is 
required by subsection (a).”).  Subsection 553(d) requires agencies to publish a rule “not less than 
30 days before its effective date” but again specifically exempts “interpretative rules and statements 
of policy.”  5 U.S.C. § 553(d).  Subsection 553(e) covers all rules and makes no exception for 
guidance documents.  Id. § 553(e).  Read in isolation, it might be possible for one to interpret the 
exception in § 553(b) as intending to exempt guidance documents from all of § 553.  But, the 
second explicit exemption in subsection (d) and the fact that subsection (a) lays out the exemptions 
to the entire section deprive this interpretation of any plausibility. 
213. This is explicitly the understanding of the Attorney General’s Manual of 1947, which 
states that § 553(e) “applies not only to substantive rules but also to interpretations and statements 
of general policy.”  ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL, supra note 19, at 38. 
214. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Peña, 44 F.3d 437, 442, 445 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(en banc) (mentioning briefly § 553(e) in granting railroads’ petitions for review of the actions of 
the Federal Railway Commission (FRC) and vacating the FRC’s orders); Nat’l Wrestling Coaches 
Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 126 (D.D.C. 2003) (recognizing the availability 
of judicial review for plaintiffs’ § 553(e) claim), aff’d on other grounds, 366 F.3d 930, 948 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004).  It is possible that other cases have not arisen because the current law does not limit the 
time within which an agency must respond.  But time limits on agency action in other contexts have 
hardly been sufficient to actually force an agency to act within the allotted time frame.  See infra 
note 221. 
215. Mendelson, supra note 7, at 439–40. 
216. Id. at 440 n.227 (citing Atchison, 44 F.3d at 442; Nat’l Wrestling Coaches, 263 F. Supp. 2d 
at 128; United Transp. Union v. Del. & Hudson Ry. Co., 977 F. Supp. 570, 574 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 
1997)). 
217. The Seventh Circuit in Atchison stated that “interested parties do not have the right to 
petition the agency for review of its interpretive rulings as they do with respect to agency rules.”  
Atchison, 44 F.3d at 442 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)).  But the court need never have addressed that 
372 Texas Law Review [Vol. 90:331 
 
statement was also dicta.218  In the remaining district court case, the holding 
was affirmed by the court of appeals on different grounds.219  Most 
significantly, the statements in all these opinions were made in passing, and 
none of these opinions considered the specific language, structure, or legisla-
tive history of the APA’s treatment of guidance documents.  There is, in 
addition, a D.C. Circuit opinion suggesting, to the contrary, that § 553(e) 
does apply to guidance documents.220  In light of the clear language and the 
nondefinitive judicial treatment of the applicability of the right to petition for 
modification to guidance documents, the dearth of cases in which 
stakeholders attempted to petition for modification of such a document seems 
to reflect an assessment that such a strategy is unlikely to succeed in getting 
courts to hold the agency accountable for the guidance document, rather than 
a belief that the strategy was precluded by the APA.221 
 
right because it struck down the interpretive rule on the merits.  Id. at 445.  The one-sentence 
mention of the right to petition for modification was made as part of a discussion of how much 
deference interpretive rules were due.  Id. at 441–43.  The sentence was included as part of the 
court’s unremarkable explanation that, in general, the APA treats legislative rules differently from 
interpretive rules.  Id. at 442. 
218. See United Transp. Union, 977 F. Supp. at 574 & n.2 (stating the same language as 
Atchison while also considering the degree of deference due interpretations in guidance documents).  
In this case, however, there was not even a petition seeking issuance or amendment of a guidance 
document so, necessarily, the statement was dicta. 
219. See Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 948–49 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004) (dismissing the claim for unlawful denial of a petition for rehearing or review as not 
ripe), aff’g on other grounds, 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 128 (D.D.C. 2003) (dismissing the claim in part 
because the guidance document did not intend to revisit the substance of a previous policy). 
220. See Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 668 
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing in dicta the availability of § 553(e)).  After carefully analyzing the 
language of § 553 of the APA, Judge Leventhal opined that if the agency began applying the 
guidance document like a legislative rule, 
the interests affected would at least have the opportunity to invoke subsection 553(e) of 
the APA to petition for a modification, an opportunity in effect to assure some agency 
consideration of comments. . . .  When there has been no procedure for comment in the 
first instance, a petition to modify may serve an appropriate objective.  On the other 
hand, this is definitely not to be construed as an invitation or authority to an institution 
to file a petition every time it feels aggrieved by some policy or instruction. 
Id. 
221. Mendelson’s proposal, which includes a six-month deadline for the agency to respond to a 
petition to modify a guidance document, may counter the potential for agency delay that could deny 
petitioners meaningful relief from a guidance document.  Unfortunately, experience has shown that 
even a statutory deadline will often be ineffective to prevent agency delay because petitioners have 
to wait for the deadline to pass to sue to get the agency to respond, and courts are so solicitous of 
administrative discretion about how to deploy agency resources that they usually grant agencies 
substantial time after the deadline to comply.  See, e.g., Rosemere Neighborhood Ass’n v. EPA, 581 
F.3d 1169, 1171–72 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing the six-year process for petitioner to get a court to 
order the EPA to rule on a complaint that by regulation the EPA was required to accept or reject 
within twenty days); Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1193 (10th Cir. 1999) (ordering 
the Secretary to designate critical habitat for an endangered species “as soon as possible,” despite 
the fact that the deadline had passed years before, reasoning that “any order now to impose a new 
deadline for compliance must consider what work is necessary to publish the final rule and how 
quickly that can be accomplished”). 
2011] Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review 373 
 
IV. Review of Guidance Documents for Reasoned Decisionmaking 
Having identified problems with procedural approaches to constrain 
misuse of guidance documents and rejected other approaches that aim to cure 
these problems, I turn now to develop a mechanism of substantive review 
that I think best balances agencies’ need for guidance documents against 
their misuse of those documents.  At the outset, I should make clear that I am 
convinced by the arguments of the ex-post-monitoring school that courts 
should get out of the business of trying to distinguish nonlegislative from 
legislative rules ex ante.  My proposal, therefore, is to add some version of 
direct substantive review to the elimination of ex ante procedural review. 
In considering the balance between the need for guidance and the 
potential for abuse, I am guided by two beliefs: first, that any official issuing 
a guidance document that takes effect without further agency action should 
first seriously consider its consequences; second, that a stakeholder adversely 
affected by such a guidance document is entitled to an explanation for the 
official’s decision.  While such thought and explanation may take time and 
effort, they are inherently more reasonable and less burdensome than requir-
ing the official to follow any particular procedure or to allow public 
participation in developing a record regarding issuance of the guidance 
document.222  To ensure that agency officials satisfy these criteria, I advocate 
that courts more readily engage in meaningful substantive review of guid-
ance documents when they are issued. 
In the context of agency actions other than guidance documents, 
meaningful substantive judicial review—by which I mean some variant on 
requiring reasoned decisionmaking—encourages agencies to consider 
relevant information carefully before acting.223  Review for reasoned 
decisionmaking has also helped transform the informal rulemaking process 
into one that allows stakeholder input that agencies must address before 
acting.224  As putative beneficiaries of regulation have organized into interest 
groups, this transformation has helped balance the influence of such benefi-
 
222. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural 
Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 69–75 (2008) (concluding that hard-look-type review can 
provide benefits for government innovation without imposing the costs of notice-and-comment 
proceedings). 
223. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness 
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1660–61 (2004) (contending that reasoned-decisionmaking 
review would discourage agency action that “does not reflect the manner in which good government 
should operate”); Seidenfeld, supra note 126, at 547 (remarking that the psychology of 
accountability suggests that reasoned-decisionmaking review would improve the quality of agency 
rules). 
224. See Bressman, supra note 126, at 1761–62 (noting that “the hard look doctrine promoted 
participation by encouraging agencies to respond to criticisms and show why they had rejected 
alternative solutions,” but also remarking that the doctrine was not entirely successful in equalizing 
participation by various stakeholders); Rossi, supra note 125, at 818 (“[T]he hard look doctrine 
ensures participation by precluding agencies from giving one interest the rubber-stamp in the 
rulemaking process, only to ignore the objections of other interests.”). 
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ciaries against that of regulated entities even to the point of inducing 
agencies to change the composition of their rulemaking teams responsible for 
shepherding legislative rules through the notice-and-comment process.225  
Moreover, immediate review of agency legislative rules relieves regulated 
entities from the dilemma of whether to comply with regulations that they 
believe to be invalid or risk significant penalties for noncompliance.226  By 
seeking review before the rule takes effect, they can obtain a judicial 
determination of its validity prior to having to comply. 
Some of the benefits of substantive judicial review, however, depend on 
the APA requirement that the agency allow stakeholders to participate in 
creating a record for the agency action.227  In addition, courts are reluctant to 
apply hard-look-type review to an action for which an agency has not created 
such a record.228  But much of the value of guidance documents stems from 
the speed and ease with which agencies can issue them.  This flexibility will 
be compromised if agencies have to engage in something akin to notice-and-
comment procedures before issuing such documents.229  Therefore, if 
substantive review is to provide similar benefits in the context of guidance 
documents, it will have to be tailored to do so despite the fact that the APA 
requires no procedures or public agency record for the development of an 
interpretive rule or policy statement.230 
In addition, judicial review for reasoned decisionmaking has been 
criticized for ossifying the rulemaking process.231  While the significance of 
this critique is debatable,232 there is little doubt that such review adds to the 
 
225. See Seidenfeld, supra note 125, at 493 & n.59 (noting that agencies have added new 
professionals to their organizations to better understand judges’ concerns and to convince courts of 
the merits of their decisions). 
226. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152–53 (1967) (noting that delaying judicial 
review of a rule mandating conduct until the agency enforces the rule poses a dilemma for regulated 
entities). 
227. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and Political 
Institutions, 55 DUKE L.J. 893, 909–13 (2006) (identifying potential ways in which increased 
participation can improve rulemaking quality). 
228.  See, e.g., Aviators for Safe & Fairer Regulation, Inc. v. FAA, 221 F.3d 222, 229–30 (1st 
Cir. 2000) (deferring to the agency’s explanation of a rule because it was “commonsense” and 
opining that if the petitioner had evidence that might undermine the explanation, it could introduce 
that evidence as part of a petition to amend the regulation); see also supra notes 211–21 and 
accompanying text. 
229. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
230. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2006) (exempting interpretive rules and policy statements 
from APA notice-and-comment rulemaking procedural requirements). 
231. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 225 
(1990) (listing agencies that have found their activities halted by judicial review); Thomas O. 
McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1400–03, 
1419 (1992) (explaining the time-consuming nature of drafting rules to withstand judicial scrutiny); 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 65–66 
(1995) (listing doctrinal shifts courts have made to reduce rulemaking ossification). 
232. See Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of 
Judicial Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251 (2009) (examining the consequences of hard-look review); 
see also William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review 
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time and resource commitment that an agency must devote to taking 
action.233  Moreover, many guidance documents are issued by staff members, 
sometimes even those significantly below the agency head.234  It would be 
difficult for an agency to police all the guidance issued by staff members to 
ensure that it can satisfy hard-look review.  Without some protection from 
full-fledged hard-look review, opening guidance documents to more imme-
diate judicial review would increase the expected costs of issuing them and, 
therefore, likely discourage issuance even of guidance documents that are 
valuable.235 
A. The Timing of Review—Finality and Ripeness of Guidance Documents 
Currently, doctrines of finality and ripeness often shield the agency 
from the potentially paralyzing effects of “direct” substantive judicial review 
of guidance documents—that is, review of such documents when issued.  
Thus, maintenance of some form of these doctrines will be essential to avoid 
increasing the costs of such documents so greatly as to unduly chill their use.  
These doctrines, however, can also stymie review necessary to discourage 
agency misuse of guidance documents.  Thus, crafting direct substantive 
review that provides the promised benefits without miring the issuance of 
guidance documents in unnecessary process will require carefully massaging 
finality and ripeness.236 
1. Finality.—The APA provides for review of all actions made 
reviewable by an agency’s authorizing statute or action that is otherwise 
final.237  Because statutes do not generally provide for review of guidance 
documents, such documents are reviewable only if they are final agency 
action.  To be final, agency action first must be the “consummation of the 
agency’s decisionmaking process”238 and second must be one “by which 
rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal conse-
 
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal 
Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 440 (2000) (reporting that agencies in most instances were 
able to reinstate the substance of rules that courts had reversed as arbitrary and capricious). 
233. See McGarity, supra note 231, at 1401 (noting the “Herculean effort” rulemakers must 
undertake so that rules will withstand judicial scrutiny). 
234. Strauss, supra note 14, at 1467. 
235. See id. at 1472 (arguing that the procedural- and hard-look-review requirements “could 
significantly impair a kind of activity [(the issuance of guidance documents)] Congress has chosen, 
perhaps for good reason, to permit on a significantly less formal basis”); cf. Emerson H. Tiller & 
Pablo T. Spiller, Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political Games in Administrative Law, 
15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 349, 351–52 (1999) (modeling how the threat of judicial reversal may 
discourage an agency from adopting its preferred policy). 
236. For a theoretical analysis of the benefits and detriments of preenforcement of rules, see 
generally Mark Seidenfeld, Playing Games with the Timing of Judicial Review: An Evaluation of 
Proposals to Restrict Pre-enforcement Review of Agency Rules, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 85 (1997). 
237. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). 
238. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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quences will flow.”239  Judicial inquiry under current doctrine is case 
specific, and there are a good number of cases in which courts have found 
guidance documents to be final agency action.240  Nonetheless, the dual 
inquiry that governs finality predisposes courts to determine that guidance 
documents are not final more often than is warranted. 
Using the first criterion, occasionally courts have reasoned that because 
an agency can change a guidance document on a moment’s notice without 
any required process, guidance documents do not represent the consumma-
tion of the agency’s consideration of the announced interpretive or policy 
question.241  Courts have also found determinations expressed in letters or 
other informal documents to be tentative when stated in the context of partic-
ular facts, suggesting that the outcome in actual cases might be different 
because the facts might differ.242  In either type of case, the ease with which 
agencies can change these actions seems to have led some courts to express 
uncertainty about whether the actions truly represent the ultimate agency 
decision on the relevant issue.243  This reasoning, however, fails to 
understand the underpinnings of this criterion. 
The foundation for the consummation criterion is avoidance of judicial 
interference with agency decision making until the agency has completed its 
own resolution.244  Therefore, the key to the consummation determination 
should not be how likely the agency is to change its mind, but whether the 
agency is actively considering doing so in the context of the action under 
review.  The mere fact that an agency can change its mind is not a good indi-
 
239. Id. at 178 (quoting Port of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget 
Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
240. See, e.g., NRDC v. EPA, 643 F.3d 311, 320 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (concluding that an EPA 
guidance document qualified as final agency action when the guidance document made a binding 
change to existing law); Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. EEOC, 530 F.3d 925, 931 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (holding that the EEOC’s decision to adopt a policy within one of its guidance documents 
constituted final agency action); Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is 
clear that the Guidance Document is final agency action because it marks the consummation of the 
EPA’s decisionmaking process and it determines the rights and obligations of both applicants and 
the Agency.”). 
241. See, e.g., Taylor-Callahan-Coleman Cntys. Dist. Adult Prob. Dep’t v. Dole, 948 F.2d 953, 
957 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that advisory interpretations of the Wage and Hour Administrator are 
not final agency actions because “they are expressly issued subject to change by the 
Administrator”). 
242. See, e.g., Air Brake Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632, 639 (6th Cir. 2004) (describing the 
NHTSA Chief Counsel’s letter explaining why a manufacturer’s product did not meet the agency’s 
safety requirements as tentative and, hence, not final action in part because it was based on initial 
facts the agency learned from the manufacturer). 
243. See, e.g., id. at 639 (describing the “conditional” nature of the NHTSA Chief Counsel’s 
letter as sufficient to suggest that the letter is nonfinal and nonreviewable); Taylor-Callahan-
Coleman, 948 F.2d at 957 (observing that agency interpretations were subject to change and, thus, 
not subject to judicial review). 
244. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.7.1, at 190 
(4th ed. 2004) (explaining that the concept of finality “is designed to avoid premature judicial 
involvement in the agency decision making process” that would take from the agency the initial 
decision-making power granted by the legislature). 
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cation that it is actively considering doing so.  Otherwise, even legislative 
rules would be subject to arguments that they are not final, because the 
agency is free to change them as well, albeit only by notice-and-comment 
procedures.245  Rather, courts should look at the language of the guidance 
document and the circumstances surrounding its creation to determine 
whether the agency has completed its current consideration.  They should 
recognize that a document that states an agency belief in a particular 
interpretation or policy sends a signal to agency staff that the agency has 
resolved the issue and that they are to act in accordance with it. 
Courts have also held that a guidance document does not represent the 
consummation of the agency’s decision-making process when issued by staff 
members below the agency head who are not authorized ultimately to 
determine agency policy or interpretation.246  This use of the consummation 
criterion makes sense when the document reflects the opinion of a subordi-
nate official and does not commit the agency to the guidance, because it must 
be applied in a subsequent action, such as a legislative rule or an 
adjudication, before formally taking effect.247  In such a situation, the agency 
head has not indicated whether she agrees with the guidance given by the 
subordinate, and she will have the opportunity to consider whether to adopt 
or reject the guidance in the subsequent proceeding.  Especially in light of 
fears of overly discouraging guidance documents,248 it seems best that courts 
treat such guidance documents as not representing the consummation of 
agency consideration.  The analysis changes, however, for a guidance docu-
ment issued by a subordinate official that takes effect without further agency 
action—for example, a decision by the director of an enforcement office of 
an agency to refrain from enforcing a regulatory or statutory provision, or 
interpreting such a provision to protect conduct that arguably is contrary to 
 
245. Funk, supra note 95, at 1336; see also Nat’l Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. 
Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding a lengthy letter from the Administrator of the 
Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor that explained an interpretation to an 
association of retail stores to be final agency action even though his decision could be changed in 
the future). 
246. See, e.g., Air Brake, 357 F.3d at 640 (concluding that the NHTSA Chief Counsel’s 
determinations regarding safety standard compliance did not constitute final agency action because 
the Chief Counsel was not delegated the authority to make such decisions); see also Franklin v. 
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 797 (1992) (stating in dicta that “agency action is not final if it is only 
‘the ruling of a subordinate official’” (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967))).  
But see W. Ill. Home Health Care, Inc. v. Herman, 150 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that a 
letter from an “obviously . . . subordinate official at the DOL” of a “relatively low position within 
the Department” did not preclude the court from finding the letter final and reviewable agency 
action because “[l]egal consequences flow[ed] from it”). 
247. See Nat’l Automatic Laundry, 443 F.2d at 700 (discussing the difference between a letter 
from an agency head and one by a subordinate official and noting that the consummation criterion is 
not required “when the interpretive ruling is signed by the head of the agency”). 
248. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
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it.249  Such a document has immediate formal consequences in that it will 
dictate the conduct of those members of staff subject to supervision by the 
official and, hence, commit at least part of the agency to a course of conduct.  
And these consequences will occur without subsequent consideration of the 
matter by the agency head.  Therefore, if the circumstances surrounding a 
staff member’s issuance of such a document indicate that the member has 
completed his consideration of the matter, it is sensible to deem the agency to 
have resolved the matter upon issuance of the guidance.250 
As noted above, monitoring guidance documents issued by field staff 
would be a daunting task, so it is potentially problematic to hold the agency 
responsible for guidance given by a subordinate staff member.  But an 
agency can alleviate this problem by adopting a procedural rule requiring a 
person seeking to challenge an otherwise-final guidance document to petition 
for reconsideration before going to court to challenge it.  As long as the 
agency provides that the guidance document does not take effect while the 
petition is pending, the decision by the lower-level official will not be final 
agency action under the APA.251  This clarification of the consummation 
criterion applied to guidance documents issued by staff members not only 
makes sense in terms of the purpose of that criterion, it also has the salutary 
effect of allowing immediate review only when shielding review of such 
documents would effectively preclude review altogether because the guid-
ance operates even in the absence of subsequent agency action. 
The second finality criterion poses a more significant hurdle for review 
of guidance documents.  The terms rights or obligations and legal 
consequences suggest that agency action must have binding legal effect if it 
is to be final.  Recall, however, that courts often define guidance documents 
as rules that do not require notice-and-comment proceedings because they 
have no legal force—that is, they do not create new legal obligations or have 
any binding effect.252  Thus, not surprisingly, numerous courts have reasoned 
 
249. This would not include agency actions that initiate further proceedings, such as the filing 
of an administrative complaint, given that the matter will be presented to the agency head as part of 
the initiated proceeding.  See FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 241 (1980) (holding 
that the FTC’s averment of “reason to believe” that Standard Oil of California was violating the 
Federal Trade Commission Act was merely a threshold determination that a complaint should 
initiate further proceedings, and not a definitive statement of position); cf. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck 
& Co., 421 U.S. 132, 157–58 (1975) (holding that memoranda from NLRB General Counsel 
regarding whether the agency should file unfair-labor-practice complaints are final agency action 
subject to disclosure under FOIA if the agency dismisses the complaint). 
250. Cf. Funk, supra note 95, at 1340 (asserting that courts are more apt to find a nonlegislative 
rule that relieves an entity from a potential regulatory burden to be ripe for review when challenged 
by the regulatory beneficiaries). 
251. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006) (stating that an agency action is not final if the agency “requires 
by rule and provides that the action . . . is inoperative” upon an application “for an appeal to 
superior agency authority”); Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 152 (1993) (asserting that the 
purpose of § 704 was to allow an agency to mandate an appeal of an examiner’s initial decision, 
which the APA otherwise made final). 
252. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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that the lack of such force weighs against deeming guidance documents to be 
final agency action.253 
There are serious questions as to whether this prong really should be 
part of determining finality of a rule under the APA.  The Court in Bennett v. 
Spear254 incorporated the language from holdings regarding finality of 
agency orders (as opposed to other actions such as rules) under the 
Administrative Orders Review Act.255  And it is not even clear why the Court 
did so, given that it has never relied on the second prong to dismiss any claim 
for review under the APA for lack of finality.256  In Bennett v. Spear itself, 
the Court held that a Fish and Wildlife Service Biological Opinion (the 
Biological Opinion) was final agency action despite the fact that the 
Biological Opinion was advisory only, and therefore did not formally bind 
the Department of the Interior.257  The Court reasoned that the Biological 
Opinion altered the legal regime because an agency that ignores it risks being 
penalized for taking an endangered species if it incorrectly determines that its 
action does not adversely affect such a species.258  In essence, the Court 
reasoned that the Biological Opinion does not mandate agency action but 
does create a safe harbor for the agency and therefore has legal 
consequences.259  But this is essentially the same effect that a guidance 
 
253. See, e.g., New Jersey v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 526 F.3d 98, 102–03 (3d Cir. 
2008) (holding that an NRC statement detailing approaches acceptable to its staff was a policy 
statement because it explicitly disavowed being a binding regulation); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l 
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d 798, 807–10 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (concluding that NHTSA’s 
letters to auto manufacturers outlining guidelines for regional recalls were not final agency actions 
because they were not binding rules); Air Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 654 F.2d 616, 620–21 (9th 
Cir. 1981) (holding that a letter from DOT’s general counsel threatening an airport with withholding 
of federal funds for violating the statute was not final because it lacked the “status of law”).  In 
some cases, however, courts have found pragmatic impacts sufficient to render agency action final.  
See, e.g., Manufactured Hous. Inst. v. EPA, 467 F.3d 391, 397–98 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that an 
EPA policy regarding the submetering-oversight programs of states qualifies as a final action based 
on EPA’s prior threats and involvement in state decision making, and the policy’s chilling effect on 
certain corporate owners). 
254. 520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
255. Id. at 177–78 (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 
113 (1948); Port of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 
71 (1970)); see also Gwendolyn McKee, Judicial Review of Agency Guidance Documents: 
Rethinking the Finality Doctrine, 60 ADMIN L. REV. 371, 403–04 (2008) (showing that the legal-
rights-and-obligations prong of finality evolved from a statute-specific limitation on review of 
orders that had to be enforced by bringing an action in court and arguing that the prong does not 
serve any of the purposes of the finality limitation on review). 
256. In National Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Department of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803 (2003), the 
Court ruled that a policy statement was not ripe for review because it had no legal impact.  Id. at 
809.  But its rationale was that the document was not final agency action and therefore its impact 
did not create hardship sufficient to make the action ripe.  Id. at 809–10.  It is not clear what the 
importation of finality concerns into ripeness added to the analysis. 
257. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177–78. 
258. Id. at 169–70. 
259. See id. at 178 (“[T]he Biological Opinion and accompanying Incidental Take Statement 
alter the legal regime to which the action agency is subject, authorizing it to take the endangered 
species if (but only if) it complies with the prescribed conditions.”). 
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document has: the document does not mandate conduct, but the entity subject 
to it potentially will face penalties if it decides to flout the guidance and 
ultimately the policy or interpretation is upheld. 
Perhaps more significantly, this second prong of the finality doctrine 
has no logical relation to the aim of preventing unnecessary judicial 
intervention into ongoing agency rulemaking.260  The doctrine might make 
sense were its aim to limit review under the APA to actions that have legal 
impacts, a narrower class of actions than those for which a petitioner might 
have standing to sue and for which suit might be ripe.261  But the Court never 
explained why the term final agency action should be read to impose such an 
impact-based restriction on petitions for review brought under the APA, let 
alone pointed to any indication that finality required by the APA meant to 
impose a limit beyond that necessary to protect ongoing agency 
considerations. 
In addition, reliance on nonlegislative rules’ lack of legal force brings us 
full circle to the distinction between guidance documents and legislative 
rules.  The same incoherence that attends to a priori determinations of which 
rules have sufficiently legal effect to be legislative is resurrected in judicial 
consideration of whether such rules are final agency action.  Moreover, were 
courts to adopt the ex-post-monitoring approach to distinguishing legislative 
from nonlegislative rules, which I support, guidance documents would have 
legal consequences—in particular, the force of precedent as well as of 
providing notice allowing agencies to change an interpretation or policy via 
adjudication.262  All of these considerations suggest that courts should refrain 
from applying the second prong of the finality standard and conclude that a 
guidance document’s lack of independent legal force should not render the 
document nonfinal per se. 
2. Ripeness.—Ripeness, like finality, poses a barrier to judicial review 
of guidance documents, although seemingly less of one for interpretive rules 
than for statements of policy.  While ripeness is a pragmatic and factually 
 
260. This lack of relation makes the prong especially problematic in cases where agency action 
clearly both represents the consummation of agency decision making and causes direct harm.  See, 
e.g., Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 190–91 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (going to great pains to avoid deciding 
whether a press release that allegedly defamed the plaintiff but had no legal impact was final agency 
action). 
261. See McKee, supra note 255, at 406 (describing how the second prong fractures proper and 
efficient judicial review by providing two instances for a court to address the hardship prong of the 
ripeness doctrine). 
262. See supra notes 127, 133 and accompanying text (describing the legal effect of guidance 
documents under the ex-post-monitoring school).  At least one case has relied on the notice that 
agency action provided to conclude that it has legal consequences.  W. Ill. Home Health Care, Inc. 
v. Herman, 150 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that a letter had “legal consequences” 
because it established the legal obligation that would subject the petitioner to penalties should it not 
prevail in an enforcement proceeding). 
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based inquiry,263 with respect to challenges to legislative rules, courts have 
distinguished between rules that directly address regulated entities’ conduct, 
which almost always are ripe, and those that have only secondary effects on 
conduct, which are not.264  There is nothing about guidance documents that 
suggests abandoning this distinction.  Frequently, however, courts have 
found guidance documents, unlike legislative rules, to be unripe even when 
they address primary conduct. 
In evaluating the ripeness of challenges to guidance documents, I 
borrow loosely from Robert Anthony’s notion of practically binding 
nonlegislative rules, focusing on rules that pragmatically are likely to affect 
regulated-entity behavior.265  As I will develop below, challenges to 
nonlegislative rules that specify how the agency views a matter of policy or 
interpretation generally should be ripe.  Courts should not impose a 
requirement that a policy statement be so clear as to specify precisely how 
the policy will operate before it can be challenged.  Nor should they find a 
document unripe because the agency has indicated that it retains discretion 
about whether and when to apply it.  With this understanding of what it 
means to be pragmatically binding, I address why such rules should be ripe 
for review and some concerns that this might pose for direct judicial review. 
For agency action to be ripe, the issues raised on review must pose a 
hardship on parties to the judicial challenge and be fit for judicial decision.266  
On occasion, the lack of independent legal force that characterizes guidance 
documents has led courts to determine that they do not impose any hardship.  
Essentially, these courts reason that a document without legal force does not 
mandate any conduct by a stakeholder and hence does not create a hardship 
of the kind that warrants petitioners utilizing the courts to interfere with the 
administrative matter.267 
 
263. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149–50 (1967) (noting that cases interpret the 
“‘finality’ element in a pragmatic way” and analyzing cases that demonstrate the “flexible view of 
finality”); Madeline Fleisher, Judicial Decision Making Under the Microscope: Moving Beyond 
Politics Versus Precedent, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 919, 935, 943 n.89 (2008) (describing ripeness as a 
“fact-centered prudential inquiry” unlikely to be determined by citation to factually analogous 
cases). 
264. Compare Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152–53 (noting that regulation puts the petitioner on 
the horns of a “dilemma” of having to choose between costly compliance or risk of penalty for 
noncompliance), with Toilet Goods Ass’n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164–65 (1967) (distinguishing 
Abbott Laboratories because the regulation at issue in Toilet Goods did not impose any legal 
requirement on the primary conduct of the petitioner). 
265. Anthony, supra note 2, at 1328.  My definition of pragmatically binding differs from 
Anthony’s in that I would look simply to whether the text of the rule specifies a determinate policy 
or interpretation of the agency.  Doing so avoids much of the difficulty in distinguishing between 
guidance documents that are practically binding and those that are not under Anthony’s approach. 
266. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149.  Some courts have read Abbott Laboratories to require that 
either prong be met, while others have required both to be met, at least to some extent.  See Neb. 
Pub. Power Dist. v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 234 F.3d 1032, 1038–39 (8th Cir. 2000) (describing 
this debate among appellate courts). 
267. See, e.g., Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 810–11 
(2003) (reasoning that the National Park Service’s (NPS) interpretation of the Contracts Dispute Act 
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Despite this reasoning, there is no doubt that pragmatically binding 
guidance documents often greatly affect the conduct of regulated entities and 
putative regulatory beneficiaries.  Such a document can put a regulated entity 
on the same horns of a dilemma as a legislative rule.  If an agency adopts a 
policy statement announcing that it intends to enforce a regulation in a par-
ticular way, an entity subject to the regulation faces likely prosecution if it 
disregards the statement.  And if the agency ultimately prevails on a judicial 
challenge to its policy, the entity will face penalties or denial of a requested 
agency action for violating the regulation.  One might respond that the 
agency could have enforced the regulation in the same manner without 
issuing the policy statement, and therefore that the entity is better off 
knowing of the policy than not.  But this ignores the pragmatic impact of the 
policy statement—that agency staff is now likely to apply the policy where it 
would not have before—as well as the legal effects—that the statement 
provides notice and precedent for subsequent agency action.268 
Putative beneficiaries of regulatory schemes also will face pragmatic 
hardships if an agency adopts a policy or interpretation that relieves a regu-
lated entity from compliance with a regulation.  If they cannot obtain judicial 
review to resolve disputes about the substantive legitimacy of agency 
guidance, beneficiaries have to decide whether to continue to engage in the 
conduct that puts them at risk of the harm that they believe the regulatory 
scheme was meant to alleviate.  For example, if an agency issues a policy 
statement refusing to enforce limits on emissions of a potentially harmful 
substance because the agency determines that exposure to the substance does 
not endanger the public health, a person who is exposed because he uses a 
product or lives in a certain locale will have to decide whether to stop using 
the product or to move to avoid exposure.  The putative beneficiary may 
have a tougher time establishing standing and ripeness than would an entity 
directly regulated by the rule, because the beneficiary would have to show 
that the manufacturer of the product that includes the substance or the pol-
luter in her locale would have lowered levels of the substance but for the 
statement.269  But this is true of the beneficiary of a legislative rule as well.270  
 
(CDA) did not impose a hardship on existing park concessioners because the NPS was not 
authorized to administer the CDA, even though the NPS construction of the CDA would affect 
concessioner negotiations with the NPS); Munsell v. Dep’t of Agric., 509 F.3d 572, 586 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (holding that an inspection policy that targeted meat processors that did not sample meat for 
E. coli contamination was not ripe because the processors were not required to engage in any 
conduct); Truckers United for Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 139 F.3d 934, 938 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (reasoning in part that the legal impact of a Federal Highway Administration statement 
indicating that trucking companies would be liable for violations of rules by their drivers did not 
create a hardship because counsel stated at argument that the companies could not change their 
conduct to avoid such liability). 
268. See Franklin, supra note 4, at 303, 305 (explaining that agencies use nonlegislative rules to 
announce how they intend to carry out their statutory mandates and that these nonlegislative rules 
affect regulated industries and the public generally regardless of how they are characterized). 
269. See, e.g., Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 936–39 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004) (denying standing to petitioners challenging a DOE statement setting out the agency’s 
2011] Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review 383 
 
Perhaps one difference (and the only difference) for the beneficiary between 
a legislative rule and a guidance document is the probability that the entities 
directly subject to the guidance will flout it and risk prosecution by the 
agency.  Thus, like the hardship on those directly regulated, the hardship on 
the beneficiary also hinges on an evaluation of how likely the guidance is to 
influence the conduct of those subject to it.  In short, when an agency issues a 
guidance document declaring that it intends to outlaw (or alternatively to 
allow) specific conduct because such conduct is prohibited by statute or 
regulation (or alternatively is not prohibited by statute or regulation), in 
many instances hardship on stakeholders pragmatically is not different from 
that generated by a legislative rule or an agency precedent in an adjudication. 
In addition to questions about hardship, courts often find that arbitrary 
and capricious challenges to guidance documents are not fit for review.271  
The major hurdle posed by the fitness requirement stems from courts’ 
propensity to find that guidance documents do not indicate clearly when and 
how agencies will apply them.272  Courts explain that they will have a better 
 
enforcement policy because they could not show that those regulated by the DOE would change the 
conduct that led to petitioners’ injuries if the DOE rescinded that statement); cf. Truckers United for 
Safety, 139 F.3d at 938 & n.3 (denying the hardship prong of the ripeness inquiry in part because 
counsel stated at oral argument that the regulated beneficiaries could not change their conduct in 
response to the agency’s guidance). 
270. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992) (explaining that for suits 
by regulatory beneficiaries, causation of injury hinges on the response of third parties to regulation 
and noting that when the plaintiff is not the object of the regulation, standing is “substantially more 
difficult to establish” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage 
Between Justiciability and Remedies—and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 
633, 680 (2006) (acknowledging that courts are more reluctant to find challenges to regulations by 
beneficiaries ripe than challenges by regulated entities); Marla E. Mansfield, Standing and Ripeness 
Revisited: The Supreme Court’s “Hypothetical” Barriers, 68 N.D. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (1992) 
(describing the difficulty for beneficiaries of showing ripeness under the Lujan standard—
specifically, the difficulty of showing that the challenged rule requires behavior modification when 
it is the regulated party, not the beneficiary, who must modify its behavior). 
271. See, e.g., Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n, 538 U.S. at 812 (holding that agency action was 
not fit for judicial review because of the lack of a “concrete dispute”); Toilet Goods Ass’n v. 
Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 162 (1967) (declining to review an administrative regulation on the merits 
because it was not fit for judicial resolution); Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. v. United States, 217 F.3d 
770, 780–82 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that agency action was not fit for judicial review); see also 
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 595 F.3d 1303, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The ‘fitness’ prong of 
the [ripeness] analysis generally addresses ‘whether the issue is purely legal, whether consideration 
of the issue would benefit from a more concrete setting, and whether the agency’s action is 
sufficiently final.’” (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 
459, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2006))). 
272. See, e.g., Interstate Natural Gas Ass’n of Am. v. FERC, 285 F.3d 18, 58–61 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (holding that a challenge to FERC’s policy allowing gas pipelines to file seasonally variable 
rates was not ripe because the FERC left it to pipelines to propose specific variable rates as part of 
their tariff filings and thus there was no factual record that showed how this policy might be 
applied); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 145 F.3d 1414, 1421 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding the EPA’s 
interpretation about its authority under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act to require 
cleanup of releases from certain waste facilities unripe because “it remains uncertain whether, or on 
what grounds, EPA would even apply this rule to clean-closed facilities”); Dietary Supplemental 
Coal. Inc. v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d 560, 562–65 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that issuance of “regulatory 
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sense of how the guidance will operate in cases challenging a particular 
application when the agency action in a concrete setting might clarify these 
issues.273  Uncertainty, however, does not distinguish those guidance 
documents that are pragmatically binding from legislative rules.  Legislative 
rules often are opaque about how they will be applied,274 and agencies retain 
discretion about whether to enforce them in particular cases; yet courts rarely 
reject arbitrary and capricious challenges to them as unripe.275  It is true that 
agency policy statements may be less clear because agencies often write 
them in nonmandatory language to avoid having them struck down as legis-
lative rules.276  But in most cases, their precatory language does not hide how 
the agency intends for the rule to operate.  Moreover, it seems perverse to 
allow agencies to escape review of a rule by couching it in language that 
essentially permits them greater leeway in applying it.277 
The upshot of my analysis of finality and ripeness is that courts can and 
should modify those doctrines to facilitate their reaching the merits of 
arbitrary and capricious challenges to guidance documents.  Allowing direct 
 
letters . . . informing recipients that CoQ10 was an unapproved food additive whose continued 
marketing subjected its sellers to enforcement actions” was not ripe for review—even though the 
FDA had seized products containing CoQ10—reasoning that since the FDA’s position on CoQ10 was 
not a final agency action, it was not bound by that position). 
273. See, e.g., Colwell v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1128 (9th Cir. 
2009) (“If and when the parties are able to provide examples of the manner in which the HHS has 
used the Policy Guidance . . . we will be in a better position to determine whether [it] functions as a 
substantive rule or as a general statement of policy.”); Munsell v. Dep’t of Agric., 509 F.3d 572, 
586 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (stating that the court had no way to evaluate the “‘myriad circumstances that’ 
will arise in connection with USDA enforcement actions taken pursuant to [the Directive]” (quoting 
City of Hous. v. HUD, 24 F.3d 1421, 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1994))). 
274. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency 
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 655–60 (1996) (arguing that judicial 
deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations encourages agencies to adopt unclear 
regulations and observing that under Seminole Rock, “an agency can safely select words having ‘so 
little color of their own that they can be made to take almost any hue’” (quoting Max Radin, 
Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 884 (1930))).  See generally Colin S. Diver, The 
Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983) (contending that transparency is 
one desired trait of agency rules that often is traded off against congruency of rules to the desired 
outcomes and minimization of rulemaking costs). 
275. See, e.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1037–40 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(entertaining an arbitrary and capricious challenge to an FCC decision not to repeal broadcasting 
ownership rules even though there was no indication what rules the FCC would adopt to replace the 
ownership rules were it to repeal them); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: 
USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 179 (1997) (asserting that preenforcement review 
of legislative rules is now the norm); Diver, supra note 45, at 412 (noting that Congress has 
reinforced the norm of preenforcement review of rules by prohibiting collateral attacks on rules in 
enforcement proceedings). 
276. See Anthony, supra note 2, at 1362 (bemoaning the fact that because vague rule statements 
are less likely to be treated as “legislative,” agencies are “rewarded” for making rule statements 
ambiguous); supra note 82 and accompanying text (citing four cases from three circuits involving 
agency-issued policy statements in which their binding qualities made them rule-like). 
277. Cf. Anthony, supra note 2, at 1361 (making the related point that allowing agencies to 
avoid notice-and-comment procedures if they retain discretion in applying a guidance document 
“leave[s] the private party in the worst of possible worlds”). 
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review of the merits of guidance documents holds the potential for encour-
aging agencies to consult with stakeholders who are not repeat players or 
politically powerful groups when developing guidance, as well as to 
seriously consider the impacts of such guidance on these stakeholders.  But, 
as I develop in the next subpart, access to the courts alone will not suffice to 
induce these salutary changes in how agencies develop guidance. 
B. Arbitrary and Capricious Review of Guidance Documents 
The foremost challenge to developing meaningful arbitrary and 
capricious review for guidance documents is creation of a standard that 
prevents agency abuse and encourages involvement of stakeholders and 
agency deliberation without bogging the agency down in the process.  The 
attractiveness of guidance documents depends greatly on agencies being able 
to issue them quickly and without devotion of undue agency resources.278  
But, at least at first glance, many benefits of reasoned-decisionmaking 
review appear to derive from requiring an agency to develop a public record 
and explain itself in light of that record.  Public comments provide valuable 
information that enables a reviewing court to determine whether an agency 
ignored questions about the basis for, or the impact of, the action under 
review.279 
In addition, courts hesitate to demand meaningful reasoned 
decisionmaking when an agency adopts a rule without developing a public 
record.  For example, courts review agency denials of petitions to adopt rules 
on grounds that the denials were arbitrary and capricious.280  But the standard 
the court applies depends greatly on whether the agency happens to have 
created a record for a court to review.  When the agency denial occurs on the 
merits after the agency has engaged in notice-and-comment procedures, 
courts have little problem applying the reasoned-decisionmaking standard.281  
When, however, the agency has not developed such a record, for instance 
where the agency refuses even to commence a rulemaking proceeding, 
 
278. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. 
279. See Coglianese et al., supra note 30, at 946 (asserting that public participation provides 
information that helps create a more complete record for judicial review); Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2271 n.90 (2001) (“[A]n extensive record of public 
comments and responses helps a court to review the adequacy of an agency’s decisionmaking 
process.”).  See generally William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 
YALE L.J. 38 (1975) (discussing the relationship of the rulemaking record to the benefits provided 
by judicial review). 
280. See, e.g., Prof’l Drivers Council v. Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, 706 F.2d 1216, 1223 
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (“Review of an agency’s denial of a rulemaking petition is under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)). 
281. See Prof’l Pilots Fed’n v. FAA, 118 F.3d 758, 763–64 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (resolving to apply 
the usual searching standard of review unless the agency decision reflects pragmatic considerations 
such as resource constraints that render such review problematic); NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 
1045–46 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting that considerations of review interfering in an agency’s execution 
of its programs are more compelling when the agency has denied an initial petition to commence a 
rulemaking than when it has held extensive rulemaking proceedings). 
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judicial review generally is not very demanding of the agency.282  This 
suggests that arbitrary and capricious review of a nonlegislative rule is 
unlikely to induce the agency to engage in meaningful consideration of the 
consequences of the rule, at least when the agency has issued the rule without 
public involvement in its development. 
One might counter that the recent Supreme Court decision 
Massachusetts v. EPA283 signals that courts are now willing to take a harder 
look at whether such denials are arbitrary and capricious.  First, however, one 
must concede that Massachusetts v. EPA can be read as a sui generis 
response to an agency’s seeming perversity in refusing to recognize scientific 
consensus on an issue that had dominated public discourse over several 
years.284  In any case, if Massachusetts v. EPA signals more searching judi-
cial inquiry into agency actions for which the agency was not required to 
develop a record, it does not lay out any operational mechanism for such 
inquiry. 
One way out of this conundrum would be for courts to treat the record 
as that information the agency considered in making its decision.  Then a 
court would evaluate the agency explanation for a guidance document based 
on the information that was before the agency when it acted.  Although an 
agency should be expected to take into account the information before it 
when it acts, in the absence of a requirement that an agency develop a public 
record, limiting the record to such information would create a perverse 
incentive for an agency to restrict the collection of relevant information to 
increase its chances of surviving judicial scrutiny.  Additionally, the absence 
of a public record would undermine one foundational rationale for the 
reasoned-decisionmaking rubric, at least if that rubric is applied without 
modification to review of guidance documents.  The genesis of the hard-look 
test suggests that it was meant to equalize the influence of various 
stakeholders in the process by forcing the agency to take seriously the views 
of groups with diffused interests, such as regulatory beneficiaries.285  Thus, 
the hard-look variant of reasoned decisionmaking requires that agencies 
 
282. See Tai, supra note 195, at 695 (“Although under APA § 553(e), a party may petition an 
agency to initiate a rulemaking, such petitions carry very little force because an agency’s denial of 
the petition is subject to a very deferential standard of review.” (footnote omitted)); Raymond 
Murphy, Note, The Scope of Review of Agencies’ Refusals to Enforce or Promulgate Rules, 53 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 86, 87 (1984) (reporting on numerous cases reviewing petitions to initiate 
rulemaking in which the courts applied a standard “considerably less demanding than the review 
afforded adoptions of rules”). 
283. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
284. For example, Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule argue that this perversity led the Court 
to distrust the agency science as improperly co-opted by politics, and that the case is one of several 
expressing distrust of administrative politics.  Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. 
EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52. 
285. Bressman, supra note 126, at 1761; Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American 
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1756–60 (1975) (describing how the “adequate 
consideration” doctrine was meant to implement an “interest representation” model of 
administrative law). 
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explain their actions in light of all considerations and alternatives to their 
chosen action that the court finds relevant, potentially including those that 
the agency may wish to ignore.286  But this test would provide no check on 
the agency ignoring information that cuts against its action if the agency gets 
to decide what information it need consider when acting. 
My solution to this seeming conundrum hinges on the recognition that 
much can be gained by requiring an agency to explain its actions even in the 
absence of a specified mechanism for creating a decision-making record.287  
Dicta from the familiar Vermont Yankee case, albeit on an issue for which the 
case is not well-known (the bounds of the National Environmental Policy 
Act’s (NEPA) requirement that an agency consider alternatives to its 
action),288 provides a blueprint for how such review without a specified 
process for creating a record might work.  Petitioners claimed that the 
Atomic Safety Licensing Board had failed to comply with NEPA when 
licensing several nuclear power plants because it had not considered 
conservation as an alternative way to meet power demands.289  An environ-
mental group opposed to the licensing of a power plant in Michigan raised 
conservation as one of a multitude of contentions.290  The Court held that 
although an agency has an obligation under NEPA “to consider every signifi-
cant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action, it is still 
incumbent upon intervenors who wish to participate to structure their partici-
pation so . . . that it alerts the agency to the intervenors’ position and 
contentions.”291  In a preface to this holding, the Court explained, 
Common sense . . . teaches us that the “detailed statement of 
alternatives” cannot be found wanting simply because the agency 
failed to include every alternative device and thought conceivable by 
the mind of man.  Time and resources are simply too limited to hold 
that an impact statement fails because the agency failed to ferret out 
every possible alternative, regardless of how uncommon or unknown 
that alternative may have been at the time the project was approved.292 
 
286. Kagan, supra note 279, at 2380; see also Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real 
World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 761 (2008) (“The [hard-look] doctrine 
found its origins in judicial decisions requiring administrative agencies to demonstrate that they had 
taken a ‘hard look’ at the underlying questions of policy and fact.  Hence agencies were 
required to offer detailed, even encyclopedic, explanations for their conclusions, to respond 
to counterarguments, to justify departures from past practices, and to give careful consideration to 
alternatives to the proposed course of action.” (footnote omitted)). 
287. I would apply my modified version of reasoned decisionmaking to review of guidance 
documents whether or not the agency actually used notice-and-comment procedures to develop 
them, to avoid deterring the agency from using such procedures. 
288. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 551–55 (1978). 
289. Id. at 552. 
290. Id. at 531. 
291. Id. at 553. 
292. Id. at 551. 
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The Court then discussed the status of conservation as an alternative to 
power-plant construction when the Board approved the nuclear plant, and 
found that “it is largely the events of recent years that have emphasized not 
only the need but also a large variety of alternatives for energy 
conservation.”293  In short, although the Court held that conservation was not 
sufficiently well recognized when the Board acted in 1969 to warrant serious 
consideration at that time, its opinion intimates that had the Board hearing 
occurred when the Court decided the case in 1977, the Board would have 
been remiss not to have considered conservation alternatives.  Moreover, the 
discussion of the understanding of conservation in 1977 does nothing to 
suggest that the Board’s obligation to consider alternatives it should have 
known to be plausible when it acted would only be triggered if those alterna-
tives were raised by participants in the proceeding. 
By analogy to NEPA’s requirement that agencies consider plausible 
alternatives to their proposed action whether or not those alternatives are 
raised by participants in the environmental-evaluation process,294 reasoned 
decisionmaking of guidance documents could mandate that agencies explain 
actions in terms of factors that are relevant and alternatives that are plausible 
given the state of knowledge available to the agency when it acted.295  
Essentially, agencies would have to acknowledge well-recognized debates in 
the relevant field about issues of fact and prediction, and explain the 
substance of interpretations or policies announced in guidance documents in 
light of its resolution of those issues.  This limitation of issues should not be 
confined to the state of knowledge of a general member of the public; 
otherwise, the agency would be able to avoid having to consider factual and 
predictive questions that it knows are relevant.  Rather, the general state of 
knowledge should be that of one who is familiar with the underlying predi-
cates for the policy or interpretation, but should not include information 
privy only to a few stakeholders because of their unique relation to the 
matter.  Moreover, stakeholders should not be able to game the system by 
proffering private information either directly to agency staff or in contexts 
outside of agency proceedings such as in public statements or petitions for 
 
293. Id. at 552. 
294. The statute requires a “detailed statement” of any “alternatives to the proposed action.”  42 
U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006).  There is no indication that this is limited by the outcome of the 
evaluation process. 
295. The D.C. Circuit formulated hard-look review at the same time that it developed the 
obligations that NEPA imposed on agencies, and many of these obligations are mirrored in 
obligations mandated by hard-look review.  See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical 
Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1300–08 (1986) (detailing how NEPA review sowed the seeds 
of hard-look review in the D.C. Circuit).  Thus, it should not be surprising that NEPA, which does 
not mandate significant involvement of the public in development of a record if the agency finds 
that its action will have no significant environmental impact, provides the template for applying 
reasoned decisionmaking when an agency acts with no need to develop a public record.  Bradley C. 
Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s Environmental 
Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 919 (2002). 
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judicial review.  Otherwise, agencies could be forced to factor into their 
guidance decisions all input of stakeholders, which would turn judicial 
review into a backdoor mechanism for forcing virtual notice-and-comment 
proceedings.296  By the same token, considerations would not strictly be 
limited to the record before the agency when it issued the guidance, as that 
would encourage an agency predisposed to a desired outcome to purposely 
ignore data and arguments that the agency should have known to be relevant.  
In addition, those challenging a guidance document should be able to have 
the reviewing court consider arguments that directly address the accuracy of 
information and the plausibility of analyses on which the agency relied in 
formulating the document.  This will deter an agency from justifying the 
document using noncredible data or flawed analyses, whether intentionally or 
simply from carelessness or laziness.297 
As an example of how reasoned decisionmaking on this limited record 
might work, one can look to the final part of the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.  In that case, the EPA argued that even if it had 
authority to regulate greenhouse gases, the uncertainty about the impact of 
such man-made emissions on global warming justified its decision not to 
regulate greenhouse-gas emissions from automobiles.298  But, the Court 
emphasized the scientific consensus that greenhouse-gas emissions have 
contributed to global warming299 and held that under the relevant provision of 
the Clean Air Act, the EPA could not simply refuse to evaluate the causal 
connection but, rather, must explain why it believed there either was no 
connection or as a matter of science it could not, or should not, evaluate the 
connection.300 
Reasoned-decisionmaking review on such a limited record would 
directly constrain agency abuse of guidance documents.  Such abuse occurs 
 
296. Strategic use of petitions for rulemaking proceedings is a concern that dates back to the 
adoption of the APA in 1946.  See, e.g., Foster H. Sherwood, The Federal Administrative Procedure 
Act, 41 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 271, 279 (1947) (viewing the right to petition for a rulemaking as 
having “doubtful value” because agencies might be “swamped by frivolous requests having delay as 
their sole objective”). 
297. The use of such data or analyses raises the same concerns that courts have addressed by 
requiring agencies to make data and analyses on which they rely to justify legislative rules available 
as part of the notice-and-comment process.  See, e.g., United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 
F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 1977) (“If the failure to notify interested persons of the scientific research 
upon which the agency was relying actually prevented the presentation of relevant comment, the 
agency may be held not to have considered all ‘the relevant factors.’”); Portland Cement Ass’n v. 
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating that the purposes of rulemaking are 
undermined when an agency “promulgate[s] rules on the basis of inadequate data, or on data that, 
[in] critical degree, is known only to the agency”). 
298. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 513 (2007). 
299. Id. at 521 (concluding that “[t]he harms associated with climate change are serious and 
well recognized”). 
300. Id. at 533.  Although the EPA had engaged in notice-and-comment proceedings, the Court 
repeatedly emphasized the publicly available scientific reports and the consensus that global 
warming is a problem, and it did not rely on the EPA’s failure to address any issue in the record.  Id. 
at 507–09, 521. 
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when an agency, believing that it would not survive judicial review were it to 
issue a legislative rule, instead issues a guidance document in a context 
where those adversely affected would either have no opportunity or 
insufficient incentive to challenge the document’s announced policy or 
interpretation.  In other words, abuse is characterized by agency knowledge 
that calls into question the validity of the announced policy or interpretation.  
If guidance documents were subject to immediate review based on informa-
tion available to the agency, the agency would have to defend the policy or 
interpretation against the very arguments that it fears would raise the threat 
of judicial reversal. 
Even if an agency issues a guidance document with a good-faith belief 
that it could defend it upon review, the fact that there actually might be 
review is likely to sharpen the agency’s consideration of potential 
counterarguments.301  Judicial review can provide a powerful tonic to agency 
staff members’ propensities to take shortcuts and ignore factors that might 
undermine their predilections about the wisdom of a policy or 
interpretation.302  Review is more likely to provide an effective tonic when it 
seeks an explanation rather than a particular outcome and the agency is not 
aware of the outcome preferred by the reviewer.303  Reasoned 
decisionmaking by a panel of judges whose identity is not known when the 
agency makes its decision fits the criteria for effective review well, whether 
there is a notice-and-comment record or simply the information available to 
the agency without the benefit of formal public input.304  So structured, 
review balances staff members’ personal incentives to dispose of a problem 
with the least amount of effort against their aversion to being reversed.  Even 
though the actual time and resources needed to reconsider a guidance docu-
ment that a court has held to be arbitrary and capricious may not be great, I 
suspect that staff members, like most individuals, experience discomfort with 
being told that their work was inadequate and, hence, will work to avoid such 
an outcome. 
Perhaps the most difficult question is whether reasoned-decisionmaking 
review without a notice-and-comment record will do anything to encourage 
participation by a broader array of stakeholders in the development and 
issuance of guidance documents.  Many familiar with notice-and-comment 
rulemaking contend that frequently the most important input of stakeholders 
into a rulemaking proceeding occurs during development, prior to the 
issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking.305  This is consistent with the 
 
301. See Pierce, supra note 231, at 68 (“[T]he duty [to engage in reasoned decisionmaking] 
may have a systemically beneficial effect on agency decisionmaking to the extent that it induces 
agencies to consider issues and values agencies otherwise would be tempted to ignore.”). 
302. Seidenfeld, supra note 126, at 522–23. 
303. Id. at 517. 
304. Id. at 516–17. 
305. See KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 61, at 81, 196, 200 (describing the importance of 
rule development before a rule is proposed); Scott R. Furlong, Interest Group Influence on Rule 
2011] Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review 391 
 
evidence that even without a consultation requirement, agencies often seek 
out input from a variety of stakeholders before formulating a policy or 
interpretation.306  Thus, it is not rare for an agency to voluntarily use 
something akin to notice-and-comment procedures before issuing a signifi-
cant guidance document.307  Even when agencies do not, they often obtain 
the views on the matter from those stakeholders with whom they deal 
regularly because such stakeholders can affect the ease with which the 
agency can implement its regulatory goals.308  Sometimes repeat players, like 
representatives of the regulated industry, can do so via a threat of political 
pressure;309 sometimes they can affect agency action because they can make 
life difficult for the agency by denying it access to information,310 forcing it 
to consider information or alternatives the agency would otherwise ignore,311 
or ultimately threatening the agency with a judicial challenge when the 
agency tries to apply the guidance.312  The availability of direct judicial 
 
Making, 29 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 325, 334–35 (1997) (reporting that interest groups believe that 
informal contact prior to a rule being proposed is one of the most effective ways to influence 
rulemaking). 
306. Mendelson, supra note 7, at 425 (noting that some agencies “regularly seek outside views 
on significant guidance and policy documents” and may do so for a variety of reasons, including 
identifying problems with the policy or detecting potential political opposition early). 
307. Id. at 425–26. 
308. Id. at 427–29; Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information 
Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1380–83 (2010); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: 
Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEXAS L. REV. 15, 23–24 (2010) (explaining 
that because so much expertise lies with industry, it is only natural for agencies to turn to them for 
the information needed to develop sound policy); Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power: 
Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 333 (2004) 
(describing how agencies can “improve the reliability of information by fostering closer and longer 
relationships with industry”). 
309. See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical 
Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 834 (2003) (describing how powerful legislative constituents 
get Congress to put pressure on agencies to regulate to their benefit); Sidney A. Shapiro, Political 
Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1994) (describing 
how administrative proceedings can be stacked to favor a prevailing legislative coalition by 
enacting policies and procedures that give interest groups influence through political pressure, 
participation, and judicial review). 
310. Wagner, supra note 308, at 1380 (“Interest groups with extra knowledge or facts relevant 
to a rule are likely to enjoy special participatory advantages in the process and may even find 
themselves working side-by-side with the agency as it develops its proposed rule.”); see also 
Croley, supra note 309, at 834 (asserting that agencies can be biased toward certain stakeholders 
“because agencies rely so heavily on information about the consequences of regulatory alternatives 
from the very interests most affected by regulation”); Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risks, 
Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1066 (1990) (describing how interest groups can 
influence agency action by providing information, among other things). 
311. See Wagner, supra note 308, at 1381 (arguing that agency staffers consider information 
and issues raised by industry in order to increase the prospect that a rule will survive judicial review 
if challenged). 
312. See id. at 1380 (highlighting the need for an agency to “engage in due diligence and reach 
out to the most knowledgeable stakeholders” in order to avoid having these groups “torpedo its final 
rule”); see also Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public 
Interest in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE L.J. 1015, 1026 (2001) (arguing that the threat to 
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review at the behest of those outside the industry levels the playing field by 
enabling these stakeholders, who may be interested only in the outcome of a 
single policy or interpretive matter, to threaten to make implementation diffi-
cult by availing themselves of such review. 
A possible response to this argument is that if a stakeholder cannot 
contribute to the record on which the agency guidance document will be 
evaluated, it cannot mount a credible threat of judicial review.  But review 
for reasoned decisionmaking leaves much uncertainty about what issues a 
reviewing court will consider sufficiently well accepted that the court will 
deem them worthy of agency attention, especially given the variation in 
perspectives of judges who might be assigned to the reviewing panel.  
Similarly, an agency rule issued without the benefit of notice and comment 
will expose the agency to uncertainty about arguments petitioners might 
present that directly undermine the agency explanation for the guidance 
document.  These uncertainties provide an advantage to challenges because 
the agency will not have had an opportunity to respond to contentions based 
on information that petitioners had no opportunity to present to it.313  The 
agency would therefore have an incentive to ferret out the likely claims that 
might be raised in an arbitrary and capricious suit and the information 
supporting such claims.  By involving stakeholders in the development of 
guidance documents, the agency can learn of the issues and arguments it 
needs to address to ensure that it survives judicial review regardless of the 
panel of judges the suit happens to draw.314 
In addition, providing review on a limited record can facilitate discourse 
directly through the challenge process.  Recall that a judicial decision that an 
agency action is not arbitrary and capricious does not shield the rule from a 
subsequent arbitrary and capricious challenge based on issues not addressed 
by the decision.315  Thus, those who have information not generally found in 
public debate that bears on the wisdom of agency guidance may still raise 
issues based on that information, if and when the agency applies the 
guidance.316  Similarly, a decision that an agency rule is arbitrary and 
 
challenge agency rules allows stakeholders to extract concessions as part of settlements of such 
suits). 
313. This might partially explain the suggestion by Matthew Stephenson that courts are less 
deferential to decisions that are made without the benefit of public input.  See Stephenson, supra 
note 158, at 530 (arguing that courts are more likely to defer to an agency decision made “via an 
elaborate formal proceeding”). 
314. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 31, at 1939–40. 
315. See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text. 
316. Courts should not circumvent such challenges by applying general statutory time limits on 
rule challenges to nonlegislative rules.  Because agencies adopt nonlegislative rules without formal 
opportunity for stakeholders to raise issues for agency consideration, under my proposal, post-
enforcement review would be the only opportunity to raise an issue that, although relevant, was not 
deemed so based on the state of knowledge available to the agency when it acted.  Thus, allowing 
suits upon application of the guidance that occurs after statutory time limits for review is consistent 
with the principle that such time limits should not apply when the petitioner would have been 
unable to bring suit within the specified period.  See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 
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capricious does not preclude an agency from adopting the same rule based on 
an amended record or additional explanation that addresses the initial lack of 
support or logical gaps in the agency reasoning.317  Therefore, in some sense 
an arbitrary and capricious challenge can begin a dialogue between 
stakeholders and the agency about the wisdom or legality of the guidance 
document.  And agencies are apt to take that dialogue seriously, if for no 
other reason than that adverse judicial decisions add to their burdens if they 
want to stick to their initial policies or interpretations. 
Of course, such review, like any review, will increase the cost of issuing 
guidance documents because the agency will have to formulate an explana-
tion that it hopes will satisfy the reviewing court that the agency considered 
all relevant factors, even when those factors are limited to those of which the 
agency is or should have been aware without the benefit of a notice-and-
comment proceeding.318  But the increase in costs should be far lower than 
that required for notice-and-comment procedures for two reasons.  First, 
because no particular procedural mechanism is mandated, the agency retains 
flexibility to develop the information it believes it needs to meet the standard 
of review by the means it chooses.  Hence, it need not spend an inordinate 
amount of time collecting, sifting through, and preparing to respond to 
mountains of unhelpful comments.319  Second, the agency need not pay close 
attention to every detail of every piece of information it gleans from 
stakeholders.  The standard of review only holds it responsible for explaining 
its decision in light of information known by those generally familiar with 
the underlying factual issues related to the matter at hand.320  In sum, holding 
agencies to a standard of reasoned decisionmaking on a record limited to 
information generally known when the agency acts provides incentives for 
 
911 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting that the court has “entertained untimely claims only in a limited 
number of exceptional circumstances where the petitioner lacked a meaningful opportunity to 
challenge the agency action during the review period”); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Donovan, 656 
F.2d 910, 914–15 (3d Cir. 1981) (“Where the right to petition for review within 30 days after 
promulgation of a regulation does not provide an adequate remedy, alternative means may be 
utilized to bring a claim . . . .” (quoting Inv. Co. Inst. v. Bd. of Governors, 551 F.2d 1270, 1281 
(D.C. Cir. 1977))). 
317. See Jordan, supra note 232, at 424 (expounding on an empirical study reporting that for 
several major rules reversed as arbitrary and capricious, the agency subsequently adopted the same 
rule by providing additional adequate explanation). 
318. See supra notes 228–35 and accompanying text. 
319. See KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 61, at 115–16 (listing potential drawbacks to 
widespread public comment, providing examples of overwhelmingly massive public outpouring, 
and concluding that “[t]he volume of public comment . . . can slow the process and interfere with 
decision making”); Cary Coglianese, E-Rulemaking: Information Technology and the Regulatory 
Process, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 361 (2004) (“[T]he tasks of gathering, processing, analyzing, and 
communicating information make up most of the administrative costs associated with 
rulemaking.”); Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for 
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 225 (1997) (“[T]he large amounts of 
information provided by participants may adversely affect the decisionmaking process by impairing 
the quality of the analysis and polarizing participants’ preferences.”). 
320. See supra text accompanying notes 294–97. 
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agencies to seek input from a wide array of stakeholders and to take care in 
formulating policy and interpretations without unduly bogging down the 
issuance of such policy or interpretations. 
Conclusion 
This Article has reviewed the extensive literature about how courts 
should treat nonlegislative rules.  Recognizing that such rules can play an 
important role in assuring coherence and accountability of agency policies 
and interpretations, and in communicating the views of agencies about such 
matters, the Article agrees with those who advocate ex post monitoring of 
agency use of documents that an agency issues without notice-and-comment 
procedures.  At the same time, recognizing that the ex-post-monitoring 
approach leaves much leeway for agencies to abuse guidance documents by 
issuing them in contexts that deprive stakeholders of opportunities to partici-
pate in their development and to obtain substantive judicial review of them, 
the Article advocates that courts generally make guidance documents 
substantively reviewable when they are issued.  The Article explains why 
other proposals to rein in agency discretion to use guidance documents—in 
particular making the agency explain its decision to proceed by this mode 
and forcing the agency to consider timely petitions for reconsideration of 
such documents—are likely to have less effect with greater cost than my 
proposal for direct review of guidance documents. 
In advocating for such review, however, the Article recognizes that 
courts will need to massage doctrines governing availability of review, such 
as those governing finality and ripeness of guidance documents.  Even more 
significantly, the Article recognizes that the very mechanism of reasoned 
decisionmaking will have to be modified to avoid seriously compromising 
the speed and procedural flexibility that make guidance documents an attrac-
tive means for agencies to communicate their views of policy and 
interpretation.  It therefore develops a variant on arbitrary and capricious 
review that would require agencies to explain issuance of guidance in terms 
of factors that are relevant and alternatives that are plausible given the state 
of knowledge available to the agency when it acted.  The Article concludes 
that such a doctrine can encourage agencies to solicit input even from 
stakeholders outside the issue networks affected by the guidance document, 
while preserving sufficient flexibility for the agency to issue the document 
quickly and without undue procedural burden. 
